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The recent financial crisis has strongly hit the European banking sector, causing a reduction of 
its dimension: the number of Euro area institutions decreased from 6.062 in 2008 to 4.385 in 
2016, while the number of bank employees has fallen by about 300.000 units during the same 
period (Nouy, 2017). In spite of this reduction, the European banking market seems to be still 
too large if compared with the other ones: for example, total assets of the US banking sector 
are equal to the 88% of US GDP, while total assets of European banks are equal to 280% of EU 
GDP. As pointed out by Danièle Nouy during her speech at the Financial Forum in Madrid on 
27th September 2017, these numbers are useful to understand an important phenomenon we are 
going to observe during the next years, which is the consolidation process of the European 
banking industry.  
Today, in the European banking market, there are too many banks competing one with the 
others, and a lot of them (in particular the smallest ones) do not cover their cost of capital: this 
is due to the fact that they didn’t react to the ongoing digitalisation process, to the decline of 
interest rates and to the new regulation asking stricter requirements for capital adequacy. What 
banks need is to revise their business models, in order to react to the change of the environment 
where they operate: this would lead to a reduction of banks size thanks to deleveraging, for 
example, but also to a reduction of their number, given that competition means that someone in 
the market loses and goes out from the market.  
There are two ways by which banks can exit the market: they can fail, or they can merge with 
another institution. Given that the recent financial crisis started with the failure of a bank and it 
spread all over the world through a contagion effect due to the interconnections between 
banking systems, mergers would be the best way to eliminate inefficient institutions from the 
market. During the crisis, however, many countries helped failing banks with taxpayers’ money, 
creating a sort of cost-free public insurance (which created wrong incentives for bad managed 
banks) and preventing non-efficient banks form exiting the market. It took some time before 
the regulator understood the problem and fixed it with the Single Resolution Mechanism, which 
should allow banks to fail without affecting the entire market.  
With the creation of the European Banking Union in 2014, the regulator created the basis for a 
continental banking market, which is similar to the US one in terms of size. In the medium run, 
the European banking market is going to become even more integrated, with the possibility for 
banks to manage their balance sheet at an aggregate level under the supervision of the European 
Central Bank. This is going to facilitate bank mergers, in particular cross border ones, which 
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are an important tool to reduce the excess capacity and to improve the efficiency of the whole 
banking sector; in addition, bank mergers are going to further increase the level of integration 
of single banking systems, with the consequence that the improvement in risk-sharing will 
enhance, consequently, the stability and the efficiency of the whole European banking system, 
while banks would benefit from economies of scale and risk-diversification, increasing their 
profitability and their efficiency.  
Even though bank’s consolidation seems to be something that banks, and the regulator should 
seek for its positive effect, during the crisis the number of M&As declined, so that in 2016 the 
market registered the lowest level of transactions in terms of value and in terms of number of 
deals (European Central Bank, 2017). There are many reasons for this decline (Nouy, 2017): 
first, banks are unsure about the value they are going to generate with acquisitions, in particular 
when the target’s assets quality is low or when the target has a lot of non-performing loans. 
Second, banks are facing important structural issues: the digitalisation process is speeding up 
and Fintechs are expanding their business, reducing even more banks’ revenues. Finally, banks’ 
uncertainty is generated also by changes in regulation (see, for example, the introduction of 
Basel III), which require banks to consider even more carefully the possible consequences 
generated by acquisitions on the compliance of rules. 
This work would like to provide a criterion with which banks should choose their target in case 
they want to perform an M&A operation to maximise their value creation. In fact, even though 
managers are often requested by shareholders to perform M&As to generate value, acquisition 
are risky and, in case they are performed without rationality, they may destroy value and they 
may even lead to the failure of a bank. To minimise risks and to maximise the post-merger 
performance, we think that bank’s acquisitions should be driven by strategic similarities: to 
prove this hypothesis, we will analyse the performance of post-acquisition entities to understand 
what has determined profitable and unprofitable mergers, and we will show how some 
differences in banks’ strategies negatively influenced performances, while some others 
produced an increase in banks’ profitability. 
The present work is organised as follows. In Chapter 1 we will perform an analysis about the 
profitability of the main European banking systems, comparing the current situation of the 
Italian banking industry with the other European ones: our analysis will not focus only on 
profitability, but it will also concentrate on efficiency. In doing so we will decompose the 
financial statements of European banks with the aim to identify, with the use of financial ratios, 
which are the main determinants of the bad performances that characterised Italian banks during 
the recent years. In Chapter 2 we will analyse which are the reasons to perform bank M&As: 
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first, we will understand whether there is room for consolidation in the European countries of 
our sample, and then, after having illustrated the different forms of acquisitions that firms may 
adopt, we will analyse which are the benefits and the risks associated to each type of transaction. 
Finally, in Chapter 3, we will study what are the factors that determine whether an acquisition 
is going to be successful or not: starting from the literature review, we will build our model to 
analyse how pre-merger strategic similarities affect post-merger performances and we will test 








Profitability of banks 
In this Chapter we will investigate the current situation of the Italian banking system in terms 
of profitability. To do that, we will first briefly recall which are the main determinants of bank’s 
profitability and then we will investigate, with the use of Bank of Italy data, which factors have 
affected the profitability of Italian banks during the last decade. Finally, we will make a 
comparison between the Italian banking system and some other European ones. 
 
1.1 The determinants of profitability 
In the banking sector, profitability is an important condition both from a shareholder’s and 
regulator’s point of view. From an investor’s perspective, profitability is important to generate 
a return (in the present and in the future) from investments, while from a regulatory point of 
view it is important to guarantee good solvency ratios even in the case of a risky business 
environment, which in turn guarantees stability for the banking system and allows to avoid 
problems in the real economy (European Central Bank, 2010). To investigate the current 
situation of Italian banks we need first of all to understand which factors affect their 
profitability. In this first section of the Chapter we briefly recall which are the main 
determinants of bank’s profitability (which will be analysed quantitatively in the next sections). 
In doing so we analyse first the main aggregates that lead to the determination of profits in the 
income statement, using the reclassification scheme provided by the Bank of Italy (2018b) in 
its annual reports; then, to complete the analysis, we consider even some other determinants 
that are not directly showed in the income statement, but which are strongly connected with the 
generation of profits. 
The first aggregate used by stakeholders to evaluate the profitability of a bank is the net interest 
income (NII) which consists in the difference between the interests that are received by a bank 
for lending money, for example as payments for loans, and the ones that the bank pays for 
receiving money, for example the ones paid to depositors. In 2017 the NII of Italian banks was 
equal to 0.9% on total assets (Banca d’Italia, 2018b) and it is still the most important source of 
revenues for banks. The NII can be seen as the income generated from the most traditional 
activity of banks and it is generally considered the most important source of revenues for banks, 
even though when interest rates are low like in the recent years of crisis, their relevance reduces 
in favour of non-interest income.  
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The second important aggregate in the income statement of banks is non-interest income, which 
includes revenues arising from negotiation and valuation at fair value, services and dividends. 
In fact, in addition to the traditional lending and deposit-taking activities, banks perform many 
other activities like checking and cash management, investment services and securities 
brokerage. All these components have different relevance in the income statement of each bank, 
depending on which activities an institution performs the most; the relevance of these 
components varies consistently even from country to country, meaning that there is even an 
influence arising from the different regulations (Albertazzi et al., 2014). An important 
consideration which should be done about non-interest sources of income is about the 
consequences of them on the global profitability of banks (Stiroh, 2004; European Central 
Bank, 2010): on one hand these revenues tend to be quite high since they come from complex 
and sophisticated activities, therefore improving the overall profitability of banks; on the other 
hand they increase the level of risk for the bank since the income generated from them tends to 
be volatile, not diversifying that much the comprehensive profitability of banks. If we look at 
the whole Italian banking sector in 2017, the services component is the most important one 
among the ones generating the non-interest income, being equal to 0.76% on total assets, while 
the others are less relevant (0.1% and 0.9% respectively). The sum of NII and non-interest 
income leads to the so-called intermediation margin. 
The next item analysts investigate in a bank’s income statement are the operating costs. This 
aggregate includes a lot of costs which are associated with the administration of a bank, but the 
most important ones are the costs associated with personnel. In 2017, operating costs were equal 
to 1.45% on total assets, while personnel costs amounted to half of this value (0.73%). The ratio 
between operating costs and the intermediation margin is the cost-to-income ratio, which is a 
very important indicator of efficiency for banks: in fact, it represents the ability of a banks to 
transform resources in revenues. The sum of the intermediation margin and operating expenses 
is the operating result. 
The sum between operating result and non-recurring revenues, impairments on goodwill and 
provisions on credits leads to the aggregate of pre-tax income. Among these last items, the most 
important ones in 2017 (and during the whole last decade) were provisions on credit, which 
were equal to 0.57% on total assets, and impairments on goodwill which, as we will see later 
on, heavily affected the profitability of banks during the financial crisis. 
Finally, to get profits we must deduct taxes. As shown by Albertazzi et al. (2016), the different 
level of taxes in European countries is able to explain, in part, the different level of profitability 
and own capital accumulation of banks in the various nations. In particular, before the crisis, 
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the profitability of Italian banks was heavily affected by taxes (-0.28% in 2005-2007), while 
after the crisis the burden of taxes decreased due to the reduction in pre-tax income. In the next 
years, when the Italian banking system will fully recover from the crisis, taxes will affect less 
the profitability of Italian banks thanks to the new tax reforms, as highlighted by De Vincenzo 
and Ricotti (2014), even though they will still have an important impact on profits. 
Thus far we have analysed only a part of all the components which affect bank’s profits. The 
European Central Bank (2010) identifies four main drivers that are required to generate 
sustainable profitability, which is defined as the capacity to maintain profits overtime: earnings, 
efficiency, risk-taking and leverage, which are discussed below.  
1. The composition and the volatility of earnings are important elements that influence the 
probability of profits to be recurring. If a source of revenues is highly volatile or if it is 
generated by an extraordinary component, it is very unlikely that the profitability of a 
bank in a year will be replicated in the following income statements. That is the reason 
why analysts investigate bank’s sources of income: they want to understand whether the 
performance of a bank is an extraordinary event or whether the bank is going to replicate 
it in the future. In addition, a persistent level of profitability should alarm about the 
possibility of an excess of risk undertaken by the bank. To analyse the composition of 
profits, analysts look at the main aggregates of the income statement and at their relative 
contribution in generating the global profitability. 
2. Efficiency is about the ability of a bank to generate profits from a group of assets or 
from a source of revenues. In fact, producing revenues is not a synonym of producing 
profits: the main difference is that costs must be deducted from revenues to get profits. 
It is possible to talk about efficiency even relating costs and revenues, like we have done 
with the cost-to-income ratio: in this case the ratio describes the ability of a bank to 
transform resources into revenues. An important consideration is that the degree of 
efficiency is strictly connected with the business model of a bank since each business 
model implies a different use of resources: this means that efficiency comparisons are 
meaningful only among banks with similar business models. The most important 
efficiency ratios used by analysts are ROE, ROE on tangible equity, ROA and cost-to-
income ratio.  
3. Risk-taking refers to the amount of risk banks undertake in performing their activities. 
This impacts the profitability of banks in two ways: on one hand, the more the 
undertaken risk, the higher can be the profitability in a good scenario case; on the other 
hand, risk affects profitability due to the adjustments that must be done on earnings 
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because of it (like the provisions associated to the credit risk). In this sense, it is 
important that the risk appetite of a bank is aligned with its strategy and its business 
structure not to damage the ability to generate profits in the future. In fact, as stated by 
Kimball (1998), a bank must find a balance in the trade-off between risk, growth and 
return to be profitable. The most used credit-risk indicators are the coverage ratio, the 
non-performing loans ratio and impairment charges as a percentage of total loans. 
4. Leverage is about the use of borrowed capital as a source of funding to increase the 
bank’s assets. The aim is to invest more to generate higher returns on capital, therefore 
boosting some profitability indicators like ROE: in this sense it can be seen as a 
multiplier of performance. But, at the same time, the higher is the leverage of the bank 
and the higher is the solvency risk for the institution, which is the risk not to meet its 
obligations. As reminded by the European Central Bank (2010), leverage should be seen 
as a warning indicator: in particular, when its value increases for more subsequent years 
and when it overcomes a level of 30, the bank is considered “non-sound”. 
The aim of the European Central Bank (2010) is to point out that to produce a meaningful 
analysis about the profitability of banks it is not enough to look at their income statements and 
at ratios made on it, but there is the need to perform a sum of the part analysis, focusing not 
only to performance depictions but even on profitability drivers. This new scheme of analysis 
is a consequence produced by the recent crisis, which has completely changed the way analysts 
investigate the profitability of banks. Today, the focus is not merely on the short-term 
performance, but it includes even a complementary analysis on risk, assets quality, capital 
adequacy and leverage. The aim is to analyse key business drivers to understand whether the 
business model adopted by banks is producing a sustainable profitability, which means that 
banks will be able to maintain their performance in the long term and that they will be able to 
absorb unexpected losses due to shocks in the future. 
To conclude, the profitability of a bank depends on a lot of factors. Some of them are related to 
the income statement of banks and they can be internal to the banking system, like operating 
costs, or external, like taxes. This implies that the profitability of banks is not only affected by 
how the banking activities are managed, but it depends even on some macroeconomic factors 
and on the tax regime, which are affected by economic institutions and by the regulator. At the 
same time profitability depends even on well identified drivers, which must be carefully 
analysed with the business model of the bank to assess whether the return obtained by the 
financial institution is sustainable, which means that it was generated by recurring components 




1.2 The Italian banking system: an analysis 
In this second paragraph, to understand the current situation of the Italian banking system and 
to identify the causes of its weak profitability during the last ten years, we will investigate 
quantitatively (using the Bank of Italy data) the performance of Italian banks. The analysis will 
follow this pattern: we will start looking at some ratios that summarize the overall profitability 
of Italian banks to have a general idea about their performance: in doing so, we will consider 
only domestic banking groups and stand-alone banks since the performance of the foreign ones 
may be heavily influenced by the different regulation and by the different macroeconomic 
situation in extra EU countries; then we will decompose these ratios to study the drivers of 
profitability we have described in the paragraph above to illustrate their dynamics and to show 
how they have affected the performance of Italian banks during the last decade. 
The first summary indicator of profitability we use to analyse the Italian banking system is 
ROE, which is the ratio between the net income and average shareholder’s equity of the year. 
ROE is a very popular measure of profitability and shareholder’s value creation since it needs 
a little public information to be derived, it allows for fast comparisons between firms and it tells 
the return an investor gets from his investment. In particular, with regard to this last point, for 
a bank it is important to have a ROE bigger than its cost of capital to produce value for 
shareholders, since the main goal of a firm is to create wealth for its owners. Figure 1 shows 
the level of ROE, adjusted ROE (net of extraordinary components like badwill, public subsidies 
for aggregations and impairments on goodwill) and ROA of Italian banks for the period 2007 














Figure 1 – ROE, adjusted ROE and ROA of Italian banks 
 
Source: own elaboration on Banca d’Italia (2018) and European Banking Federation (2018) data. ROA is 
measured in the right-hand scale. 
 
As we can see from Figure 1, Italian banks experienced a strong reduction in their profitability 
during the financial crisis. For what concerns the ROE, it started decreasing immediately after 
the beginning of the crisis in 2007 (when it was equal to 12,8%) reaching a negative value for 
the first time in 2011 (-9,3%); then it remained negative for two years, with a new negative 
peak in 2013 (-8%), while in 2014 and 2015 the profitability of Italian banks became positive 
again, even if it was quite low. Finally, in 2016 there was again a negative peak, while in 2017, 
for the first time after ten years, the level of ROE was above 5%, reaching a value of 7%. From 
these numbers it seems that after the strong reduction in profitability during the last decade due 
to the crisis and after the strong negative peaks reached in the recent years, the Italian banking 
system has started recovering in 2017, moving toward the pre-crisis level of profitability. 
As reminded even by the European Central Bank (2010), ROE is a very popular indicator of 
performance, but it tells almost nothing about the sources of bank’s profitability. This is due to 
the intrinsic nature of this ratio, which leads to some shortcomings:  
• ROE doesn’t tell anything about the nature of the determinants of bank’s profitability. 
Looking at ROE, we are not able to tell if profits were generated by the bank’s traditional 
activities or if they were the result of extraordinary operations. In other terms, ROE 
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maintain results overtime, which is related to the composition and to the volatility of 
earnings. The more profits are generated from extraordinary and volatile revenues, the 
lower the probability of profits to be recurring and the lower the probability that the 
level of ROE will be high in the future. 
• ROE doesn’t provide any information about the future performances of a bank since it 
provides a snapshot of the current situation (it is a short-term indicator), so we are not 
able to understand whether a reduction of the index is due to actions (like restructuring 
or consolidation) to boost future performances or whether it depends on the decline of 
recurring revenues.  
• ROE can be manipulated, in the sense that assets can be classified in different portfolios 
producing different effects on the ratio, leading to non-significant comparisons among 
banks. In addition, given the differences between the various accounting standards, it is 
very hard to make meaningful cross-border comparisons using ROE exclusively. 
Given the highlighted ROE’s shortcomings, we will use some other tools to integrate the study 
about the profitability of Italian banks. First of all, we try to overcome the problem related to 
the presence of non-recurring revenues in order to study the sustainability of bank’s profits, 
therefore removing from the numerator of the ratio the amount of revenues arising from 
extraordinary operations, like badwill, public subsidies for aggregations and impairment on 
goodwill: in this way we obtain the adjusted ROE (data are provided by the Bank of Italy, 
2010). As we have already highlighted in the first paragraph, a part of volatile revenues is 
included even in non-interest income: therefore, removing those elements from the numerator 
of the ratio solves only partially the problem of the influence of non-recurring items in the 
analysis of bank’s profitability. We will overcome definitively this problem in the subsequent 
parts of the analysis. 
By looking at the adjusted ROE represented in Figure 1 we can see how the variability on 
profitability was considerably lower, in particular in 2011, 2012 and 2014, when the value of 
adjusted ROE has the opposite sign than the one registered by the simple ROE. This means that 
during those years the profitability of Italian banks was heavily affected by the consequences 
of the financial crisis which led not only to a decrease of the main determinants of the net 
income (like the NII, as we will investigate below) but also to the presence of negative 
extraordinary components of income. In addition, another important information that we can 
anticipate from the adjusted ROE is that the profitability arising from the core business of banks 
is still far from the complete recovery: before the crisis its level was above 11%, while after 
2008 Italian banks were not able to generate returns on their capital above 5% without 
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extraordinary components. This clearly shows how the profitability of the Italian banking 
system was affected by the crisis and how much the system is still far from the full recovery.  
Another indicator we can use to study the Italian bank’s profitability is ROA, which is defined 
as the ratio between the net income and the average value of total assets of the year. Figure 1 
shows the level of ROA of Italian banks during the last decade: in 2007, the ROA of Italian 
banks was equal to 0.82%. With the crisis, its level strongly decreased until it became negative 
for the first time in 2011 (-0.66%) and it remained below zero until 2015, when its value was 
0.1%. In 2016 there has been a new decrease which brought ROA to -0.47%, while in 2017 the 
value raised to 0.15%. As we can see from the graph, given that the numerator is the same, the 
values of ROA tend to have the same dynamic of the ones of ROE and adjusted ROE, but since 
banks have a very high leverage, a little difference in ROA can imply a big difference in ROE: 
this is due to the fact that ROE does not include debt in its denominator, so an increase in profits 
originated by an investment financed with debt is intercepted in the numerator, while the 
denominator remains the same, therefore boosting the value of the ratio.  
What we can say from Figure 1 is that the financial crisis heavily affected the profitability of 
Italian banks during the last decade: on one hand it affected the core business of banks, as shown 
by the strong decline in the adjusted ROE during the whole crisis, while on the other hand the 
profitability was strongly hit even by some extraordinary components arising in some specific 
moments of the financial crisis, in particular impairments on goodwill during the second phase 
of the crisis (in 2011 and 2013), which were necessary in order to align book values with market 
ones. 
The next step to deepen the analysis about the profitability of Italian banks during the last 
decade is to decompose the numerator of ROE and ROA to understand the dynamic of 
profitability drivers, in particular the one of earnings. This analysis is important to study how 
the crisis hit the different activities performed by banks to identify which are the main problems 
of Italian bank’s profitability today and to understand, with our analysis, whether a 
consolidation in the Italian banking sector can be a solution to these problems.  
Figure 2 represents (following the scheme provided by the Bank of Italy) the decomposition of 
earnings of Italian banks into the most important aggregates of the income statement for the 






Figure 2 –Main components of Italian banks’ profitability (percentage points*) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Bank of Italy data. *Percentage points on average total capital of the year. 
**Leverage measured in the right-hand scale. **Average capital of the year on total asset at the end of the year, 
right-hand scale. 
 
Figure 2 provides a general view about the profitability of Italian banks during the crisis and it 
allows to perform a first analysis about it looking at the dynamic of its determinants. First of 
all, during the last decade the NII registered a slow but continuous decrease, and its value on 
the average capital of the year moved from 27% in 2008 to17% in 2017, which means that 
banks, after 2008, were no more able to generate the same amount of revenues with their most 
traditional activity of lending money. This result is confirmed even by Figure 3, where there is 
a representation of the volumes of NII during the last decade: in 2007 the amount of revenues 
generated by NII was equal to 42.175 million of Euro; ten years later, after a slow but persistent 
decrease, it was equal to 32.309 million of Euro. It is quite simple to explain the reason for this 
decrease: in fact, before the crisis (2003-2008), the difference between the lending rate and the 
rate that banks paid to depositors was on average 4%, while after the crisis (2009-2013) it was 
on average 3.1% (Emiliani, 2014). This is the result of two different components: on one hand, 
in 2009-2010 there was a reduction in interest rates on loans (due to the reduction in market 
interest rates) which in turn produced a strong reduction in the NII, given the big amount of 
variable interest rate loans in the balance sheet of Italian banks; on the other hand, starting 2011, 
with the crisis of sovereign debt, the cost of funding for banks increased due to different reasons 
(a reduction in the source of funding in international markets, the perceived high risk of bank’s 
assets and capital adequacy requirements) and it was only partially compensated by an increase 
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in the interest rate paid by customers for the higher risk. Given that, before the crisis, NII 
represented the biggest part of Italian banks’ profitability, we can say that Italian banks suffered 
a lot during the last ten years due to their business model, which is characterised by a strong 
focus on lending money to families and firms and by a very low exposure to structured 
securities. 
Figure 3 – Intermediation margin analysis (in millions of Euro) 
 
Sources: own elaborations on Bank of Italy data. *Other revenues/intermediation margin measured in the right-
hand scale. 
 
The second important thing we can say looking at Figure 2 is that while the weight of net 
commissions on total assets remains stable at 12% during the decade, the weight of other 
revenues different from commissions increased visibly, passing from the 2% in 2008 to the 5% 
in 2017 (with a peak of 7% in 2013). The representation of the ratio between other revenues 
and intermediation margin in Figure 3 confirms this trend: after the crisis, the relevance of other 
revenues in the composition of the intermediation margin has increased overtime, passing from 
43.2% in 2008 to 51.5% in 2017. This is the reflection of a diversification in the sources of 
revenues which was adopted by Italian banks not to suffer for the low interest rate environment 
and the consequent reduction of the NII (Goracci, 2016). In particular, some banks (e.g.: Intesa 
San Paolo), decided to modify the composition of their revenues: even with an increase of 
interest rates and so with a recovery of the intermediation margin generated by a surge in the 
NII, the overall profitability of Italian banks would still suffer due to other external factors like 
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of commissions on payments (Visco, 2018); so, in the recent years, banks decided to 
differentiate their sources of revenues performing activities like insurance, asset management 
and asset gathering, which can be sold directly to customers with their already existent and wide 
spread branches (Chakraborty, 2016). In addition, we can see in the Figure 3 that even the stand-
alone volume of commissions has increased during the crisis as a consequence of the 
diversification strategy of banks: in 2015, the volume of commissions was 14% bigger than the 
one registered in 2007, and in 2015 the increase in volume with respect to 2014 was equal to 
5.6%. What is important to point out is that the diversification of the sources of revenues was 
not able to completely compensate the reduction of the NII: summing up the three components 
plotted in the graph, we can see how the intermediation margin reduced during the crisis and 
how it hasn’t completely recovered yet. In addition, we can see how there is a certain degree of 
variability in commissions and other revenues components: this supports the idea that even 
though these sources partially compensate the reduction of profitability due to lower interest 
rates and even though they are an interesting source of income for banks given they don’t absorb 
capital (in contrast to loans and mortgages), they do not reduce the overall volatility of bank’s 
profits since they tend to be non-recurring in time. 
Looking back at Figure 2, we can see how another important determinant of low bank’s 
profitability were operating expenses. During the last decade, their percentage value on total 
assets was quite volatile: in 2008 it was equal to 27%, then it decreased reaching 23% in 2010 
and it remained almost stable until 2014 when it reached its minimum at 22%; finally, it 
increased a bit reaching a new peak of 25% in 2016. To have a clearer view about the dynamic 
of operating costs we should look at their absolute values reported in Figure 4. As we can see, 
during the crisis, banks tried to reduce the weight of operating costs to compensate the reduction 
of revenues: in particular, in doing so, banks reduced their presence in the territory, therefore 
diminishing the number of employees and branches. This is clearly visible in the graph which 
shows that for the first time in 2015 the expenses for the personnel are less than the remaining 
operating costs. If we look, instead, at the cost-to-income ratio, plotted again in Figure 4, we 
can see how it increased overtime (with raise and falls), moving from the 58.1% of 2008 to the 
69.4% of 2017, with a peak of 73.7% in 2016. The increase in the cost-to-income ratio in 2011 
was due to the strong reduction of banks’ income due to the sovereign crisis, while the increase 
in 2015 and 2016 was due to a surge in operating costs to implement a structural turnaround to 
optimize the distribution and the business model of banks (Romeo, 2017; KPMG, 2018a), 
which has started producing its effect in 2017, when there was a considerable decrease of the 
burden of operating expenses. As we have pointed out in the first paragraph, the cost-to-income 
22 
 
ratio is an important indicator of efficiency and it is strictly influenced by the business model 
of banks: in this sense we can say Italian banks need to improve their business model to enhance 
the productivity of the resources they use in performing their activities. This translates in 
investing in digitization and technology and adjusting the cost structure to the new business 
model. 
Figure 4 – Operating expenses (in millions) 
 
Sources: own elaboration on Bank of Italy data. *Cost-to-income ratio measured in the right-hand scale. 
 
Finally, we analyse the remaining determinants of bank’s profitability. Looking back at Figure 
2 we can see how credit risk adjustments impacted on the profitability of banks over the last 
decade. The ratio between adjustments and total assets changed a lot during the observed 
period: it was equal to 6% in 2008, then it raised during the crisis, reaching some peaks in 2012-
2014 (15%) and in 2016 (14%). This delay with respect to the beginning of the crisis is due to 
the fact that the deterioration of credit is a process that takes time to emerge and to the fact that 
at some points in time some banks decided to clean bad debts from their balance sheet 
voluntarily, to improve their performance, or because the regulator asked for more provisions 
to reduce the risk of default in the banking sector. If we examine the Figure 5 we can see how 
the nominal value of provisions for bad loans increased during the crisis, in particular after 
2012, heavily affecting the profitability of Italian banks. This is showed by the ratio between 
provisions on bad debts and the operating result: in 2007, before the crisis, the volume of 
provisions was equal to 15.4%, while two years after the volume was equal to 47.8%. After 
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to raise even in the following years, when provisions completely overcame the operating result 
of banks. In the last three years the volume of provisions decreased, reaching values slightly 
above 70%, with the exception of 2016, when some intermediaries decided to increase their 
coverage on bad loans to clean their balance sheet. The rapid increase in the volume of 
provisions during the crisis was due to the deterioration of credits, which increased overtime 
due to the crisis which caused a worsening of the macroeconomic situation of Italy (in particular 
because of a lack of growth), but also due to the requirements set by the supervisor and by the 
legislator (Lauriola, 2017). In fact, if we consider the coverage ratio (on credits other than in 
bonis) of Italian banks in Figure 5, we can see how it strengthened in the last decade: it was 
equal to 49.5% in 2007 and it constantly decreased during the crisis until 2012, when it was 
equal to 39%. Then is started increasing reaching a peak of 52.7 in 2016. Finally, in 2017 the 
ratio slightly decreased, being equal to 50.6%. Coverage ratio is an important indicator of risk 
since it measures the ability of a bank to absorb potential losses on non-performing loans. The 
main reason for the strong decrease of the coverage ratio at the beginning of the crisis was the 
strong increase of non-performing loans, which was bigger than the increase in provisions 
during the same years. At the same time, the main reason for the increase of the ratio after 2012 
was the strong increase in the volume of provisions, as it is possible to observe in Figure 5, 
which grew faster than the increase of NPLs. 
Figure 5 – Provisions (in millions) 
 
Sources: own elaboration on Bank of Italy data. *Provisions on bad debts/operating results and coverage ratio 
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The last thing we need to analyse to understand the current situation of Italian banks is their 
leverage, defined as the ratio between Tier 1 capital and bank’s average total consolidated 
assets. From Figure 2 we can see how the value of leverage of Italian banks changed during the 
last ten years: in 2007 it was equal to 7.3%, then it increased reaching a peak of 8.5% in 2010 
and later there was a fast decrease in the ratio which led to a value of 7.4% in 2012. After that 
there was a new raise to 8.4% in 2015, while during the last two years the leverage ratio of 
Italian banks slightly decrease to a value of 7.8% in 2017. Under the Basel III regulation, banks 
are required to have a leverage ratio equal at least to 3%: the aim of the leverage ratio is to 
discourage banks form underestimating risk and so to improve the stability of the financial 
system. Given that the higher is the ratio and the higher is the part of assets that is financed by 
own capital, the higher is the leverage ratio of a bank and the better is the for the banking 
system: in fact, in case of impairment on assets, the bank has more capital available to absorb 
losses before the default. The volatility of the leverage ratio during the last decade could be 
explained considering that the reductions were in large part the results of impairments on credits 
while increases were mainly due to capital requirements set by the supervisor to guarantee the 
stability of the banking system.  
We can conclude that the profitability of the Italian banking system is affected by some critical 
factors: the business model of banks, which is still focused on lending and deposit-taking 
activities. Italian banks need to change their business model, investing in new technologies and 
in digitization to diversify their sources of revenues and not to suffer the competition of 
Fintechs. In addition, this would strengthen their profitability and their competitive position, 
providing new sources of revenues which could be used to make new investments and, also, to 
reduce costs. Another issue is related with the incidence of operating costs on profitability, in 
particular the ones related to the personnel, which is still very high. In the last few years, banks 
started implementing structural turnarounds (which are expected to produce their effect in the 
medium run) to reduce the burden of operating costs and therefore to improve their operating 
efficiency. Finally, the last problem is the one related to provisions on credits: the financial 
crisis and the consequent macroeconomic situation in which banks operate led to the 
deterioration of a lot of credits and this, in combination with the supervisor requirement, 
produced heavy consequences in the income statement of banks. The costs associated to the 
credit risk are still one of the main negative components that affect negatively the profitability 
of the Italian banking system, and they are forecasted to do so for a while. In this sense, we can 
say there is a circularity: capital consistency is required to clean bad assets from the balance 
sheet of banks, while at the same time bad assets prevent banks from producing earnings which, 
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if retained, could be used to strengthen the capital position and to improve the future 
profitability making new investments. 
 
1.3 European banking systems comparison 
To better understand the current situation of the Italian banking system, in this last paragraph 
we will make a comparison between Italian banks and the ones operating in the main European 
countries, using the most important ratios we have already seen in the previous analysis. The 
decision to limit our analysis only to European banks was taken to highlight the differences 
among banking sectors other than the ones generated by the regulation (for example capital 
requirements) and by the macroeconomic environment (like the consequences of different 
interest rates) and to limit the consequences caused by differences in the various markets (like 
in the labour one). For our investigation, we will consider banks operating in Germany, France, 
Spain, Finland, Netherlands and Portugal: these countries belong to the European Union and 
all of them use the Euro as national currency, so that the results of the comparison do not depend 
on monetary policy; in addition, we will consider even the weighted average value of all 
European countries to make a comparison with the banking sector of the continent. For our 
analysis we will use data coming from the European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse 
and we will consider only domestic banking groups and stand-alone banks of any size of each 
country not to influence the investigation with third countries players’ performance. 
Figure 6 – ROE of European countries (in percentage) 
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The first indicator is ROE. Figure 6 shows the levels of ROE of the European banking sectors 
we decided to compare with the Italian one. Almost all the countries (with the only exception 
of Germany and the Netherlands) had a lower ROE in 2017 than the one they had in 2007: this 
was clearly an effect of the financial crisis which has hit the profitability of the whole European 
banking sector. In particular, the double-digit return on equity era seems to be a distant memory: 
while in 2007 the ROE of the European banking sector was 10.02%, with the beginning of the 
crisis the profitability strongly declined, reaching its minimum in 2008 (-2.78%) and, with an 
alternation between (small) positive and negative values, it remained below 5% until 2017, 
when it was equal to 5.79%. What is relevant is the different pattern followed by each country: 
for example, Germany’s and the Netherlands’ profitability lagged behind at the beginning of 
the crisis (2008), and their ROE was even negative, while all the other countries in the sample 
had positive returns during the same year. If we look at the values of the ratio in 2010, instead, 
we can see how the profitability of German and Dutch banks recovered and turned positive, 
even outperforming the average return, while all the other banking systems experienced a 
decline. Another important thing we can see from the graph is how there are three countries 
which were hit the most by the crisis and whose performances were almost constantly below 
the average: Italy, Portugal and Spain. Their profitability was strongly affected by the 
consequences of the financial crisis in the real economy, which in turn produced difficulties for 
householders and firms which led to a deterioration of the activities performed by banks, in 
particular in the market of loans and mortgages. An example is clearly visible in the ROE of 
the Spanish banking system in 2012: Royal Decree-Laws required extraordinary provisions to 
write down loans for real estate activities (McKinsey, 2016). Finally, looking at the graph we 
can see how during the last decade there was a reduction in the volatility of ROE, and the 
profitability of the different banking systems converged toward the average European value. 
Some countries (like Italy, Spain and Portugal) experienced a strong volatility in the return on 
equity of their banking systems, which was mainly due to the provisions requirements for bad 
loans that were asked by the supervisor and which strongly affected the net income of banks, 
while some other countries (like France and Finland) experienced less volatile returns thanks 
to more stable profits. 
Figure 7 shows the values of return on assets of the European banking systems in our sample. 
The considerations we have done about the ROE holds true even for the ROA: even using this 
indicator we can see how the crisis hit the profitability of European banks during the last decade. 
The average ROA passed from 0.48% in 2007 to 0.42% in 2017 (we remind that given the ROA 
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is not influenced by the leverage, a small change in ROA may lead to big changes in ROE, as 
we have seen), but during these ten years the average profitability of European banks became 
negative three times (in 2008, 2011 and 2012): this data provides a clear view about the strength 
of the crisis in the banking sectors of the continent. Even looking at this ratio we can see how 
the German and the Dutch banking systems registered lower (negative) values in 2008 and then 
they recovered, while the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Italian ones were the most affected 
countries and they experienced the most volatile returns. Finally, even the values of ROA tend 
to converge to the European average in the most recent years, although less markedly than ROE 
does. 
Figure 7 – ROA of European countries (in percentage) 
 
Sources: own elaboration on Statistical Data Warehouse, European Central Bank. 
 
As we have done for the Italian banking system, now we focus on the first driver of bank’s 
profitability, which is the analysis related to the composition and the volatility of earnings. 
Figure 8 represents the volume of NII for all the countries in our sample. As we can see from 
the graph, during the first years of the crisis (2008-2009) almost all the countries benefitted 
from the reduction of interest rates generated by the monetary policy of the European Central 
Bank, which in turn produced a decrease of bank’s cost of financing and therefore generated an 
increase in the NII. This increment had different sizes in the different banking systems: in 
France, for example, it was very huge thanks to the EUR 111 billion support measures taken by 
the government which were vehiculated to the economy through the Société de Financement 
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only moderated, while in Finland and Portugal the situation remained almost the same. If we 
look at the remaining years (2010-2017), instead, we can see the different patterns followed by 
each banking system: some of them, like the German and the Portuguese ones, registered a 
slightly decreases in their NII, while the Dutch banking system was the only one that 
experienced an increase. Italian and French banks were the ones who suffered the most for the 
reduction of interest rates in the long run, while the Spanish one was the only one who 
maintained its volume of NII (even though with strong fluctuations during the years). Given 
these results, we can say that the reduction in interest rates produced a decrease in revenues 
generated by the lending and deposit-taking activity of banks, therefore we can say that a part 
of the overall decrease in profitability of banks registered by ROA and ROE is attributable to 
the reduction of the NII. Until now we have analysed only the profitability generated by the 
most traditional activity of banks, which is even the more stable and recurring component of 
income, but to have a comprehensive view about the profitability of banks we need to look even 
at the other components of revenues. 
Figure 8 – Net interest income (in thousands of Euro) 
 
Sources: own elaboration on Statistical Data Warehouse, European Central Bank. 
 
Figure 9 shows the volume of net fee and commission income of the countries in our sample 
during the last decade. As we can see from the graph, all the countries (with the exception of 
Netherlands and Portugal) registered in 2017 an increase in the volume of fees and commissions 
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while in some others, like Italy and Germany, the increase was significant but lower. As we 
have already pointed out in the analysis of the Italian banking system, the increase in this 
aggregate of the income statement is important since it demonstrates banks tried to retrieve the 
income they have lost due to the reduction in the NII by strengthening fee and commission 
generating activities. What is important to notice is the degree of volatility of these sources of 
income: in fact, looking at the graph we can see how in almost all the countries (excluding 
Finland and Portugal) the volume of commissions and fees doesn’t follow a trend but tends to 
have quite substantial fluctuations. So not only Italian banks but even the other European ones 
tried to balance the reduction of the NII with commissions and fees: this is a way to diversify 
their sources of revenues and to contrast the worsening of their profitability, even though the 
variability of fees and commissions does not reduce the overall volatility of bank’s profitability. 
Figure 9 – Net fee and commission income (in thousands of Euro) 
 
Sources: own elaboration on Statistical Data Warehouse, European Central Bank. 
 
The next issue we will consider is the efficiency of the banking systems of the countries in our 
sample. Figure 10 represents the cost-to-income ratio of the main European banking sectors 
during the last decade. As we can see from the graph, there was a lot of volatility during the 
observed period and today there is a lot of heterogeneity among countries in terms of efficiency. 
At the beginning of the crisis, in 2007-2008, the countries with the lowest cost-to-income ratio 
(with values below 60%) were Finland, Portugal and Spain, while the European average was 
68.07%; Germany and the Netherlands, instead, were the less efficient countries, with ratios far 
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exceptions of Germany and the Netherlands, which improved their efficiency) registered an 
increase in their values of the ratio: this was mainly due to the reduction of the income of banks, 
which led to a decrease of the denominator and so to an increase of the ratio. From 2012 
onwards, the average European value of the ratio was stable at around 65%: some countries like 
Finland, Portugal and the Netherlands experienced an increase of their efficiency which were 
due both to a reduction of operating costs and to an increase of their profitability, while some 
other countries (like France and Germany) maintained their values or they even suffered an 
increase (like Italy). To better understand the composition of bank’s operating expenses we can 
look at Figure 11, which represents the ratio between the total cost for staff and total operating 
expenses during the last decade. As we can see from the graph, each country followed a 
different pattern: Germany had the highest volatility in the sample due to the very high volume 
of operating expenses other than the administrative ones and depreciation during the period 
2007-2014, while in the years later the situation was in line with the other countries in the 
sample. Other banking systems, instead, like the French and the Dutch ones, experienced almost 
stable values of the ratio during the observed period, while Italy, Spain and Finland registered 
a moderate but significant decrease in their ratios. In fact, due to the difficulties which may 
arise because of the laws connected with the legal systems of the different countries, even low 
reductions in the ratio represent huge steps forward to increase the operational efficiency of 
banks, but just as long as reductions are not the results of an increase in the denominator, so 
when they are not due to an increase of the overall costs of banks. The incidence of personnel 
expenses on total operating costs is an important indicator for banks to understand whether to 
take action in the company’s organization to increase their operational efficiency: as pointed 
out even by Visco (2018), in fact, the profitability of Italian banks (but also of European ones) 
is still affected by the high impact of personnel costs. For banks it is very important to try to 
limit this impact since the other operating costs are forecasted to increase in the next years due 
to investments in new technologies which may not be extended anymore: by limiting the impact 
of personnel expenses, banks would have the possibility to make these investments without 
compromising their operational efficiency. As we have seen, for example, with the Italian case, 
some banking systems have already started working on that, while some others, like Germany, 
have still too high costs which must be reduced in the near future not to hinder new investments: 
given that reducing operating costs (in particular the ones connected with the personnel) is a 
process that takes time to bear fruits, it is important to make long-term planning and to start 
working immediately to achieve the result of a slow but continuous improvement of efficiency 
in the next years. 
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Figure 10 – Cost-to-income ratio (in percentage) 
 
Sources: own elaboration on Statistical Data Warehouse, European Central Bank. Netherlands in 2008 equal 
to203.4. 
 
Figure 11 – Staff expenses (% of total expenses) 
 
Sources: own elaboration on Statistical Data Warehouse, European Central Bank. All institutions and domestic 
banking groups and stand-alone banks. 
 
The next issue we analyse is how the credit risk affected the profitability of European banks 
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for non-performing loans for all the countries in our sample, therefore to perform our analysis 
we will consider the ratio between gross non-performing debt instruments and total gross debt 
instruments (whose values in the last decade are displayed in Figure 12), which can be used to 
guess the amount of provisions in the income statement of banks in each country and therefore 
their impact on profitability. As we can see, at the beginning of the crisis the values of this ratio 
were quite low and the percentage of non-performing instruments was on average 2.97%; in 
2007, Italy was the only country above the European average, with a value of 4.34%. Years 
after years, when the financial crisis started affecting the real economy and the macroeconomic 
environment worsened, the number of non-performing loans started increasing everywhere and 
the countries who suffered the most for the crisis (like Italy, Spain and Portugal) experienced 
an important boost in their ratio: Italy reached a peak of 13.83% in 2014, Spain 7.91% in 2013 
and Portugal 15.92% in 2016, while the EU average reached its maximum value of 5.25% in 
2015; some other countries, like Finland and the Netherlands, instead, maintained a ratio below 
4%. This translated in a dramatic increase of provisions for bad loans (even due to the 
requirement of the supervisor and regulators, as in the Spanish case) which heavily affected the 
net income of European banks, therefore reducing their profitability. In the last years, with the 
(moderate and not widespread) recovery and thanks to the cleaning of bank’s balance sheet, the 
number of NPLs has reduced (this is visible looking at Figure 12), but they are still affecting 
the profitability of the banking sector (see for example the effect of provisions on the 
profitability of Italian banks in 2016) and they are forecasted to do so at least for a while. 
Finally, in this Chapter we analyse the leverage of the European banking systems included in 
our sample. Figure 13 shows the values of the equity multiplier ratio, which is defined as the 
ratio between the financial assets of banks belonging to a certain banking sector and their 
amount of equity. As we can see from the graph, in 2007 the values of the ratio of all the 
countries were below 15; with the beginning of the crisis in 2008, these values immediately 
increased all over the Europe, with some countries (like Germany, France, Netherlands and 
Italy) that reached values bigger than 20: this increase was due mainly to the negative 
performances of European banks (as already shown with the ROE analysis in Figure 6) which 
reduced the amount of equity of banks, therefore increasing their leverage. This phenomenon 
repeated in 2011 during the crisis of sovereign debts, when the level of Italian bank’s leverage 
reached a value of 39.93 (which was a very alarming value, given that the threshold for a 
dangerous situation is at 30); in the subsequent years the value reduced thanks to capital 
injections and (small) positive returns, and in 2017 the equity multiplier ratio of the Italian 
banking system was equal to 18.14. 
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Figure 12 – Gross non-performing debt instruments (% of total gross debt instruments) 
 
Sources: own elaboration on Statistical Data Warehouse, European Central Bank. Figures prior to 2014 reflect 
the national definition of non-performing exposures. 
 
The dynamic of the ratio was different from country to country: some countries, like Germany, 
France and the Netherlands experienced strong increases in their leverage, while some other 
like Finland and Portugal suffered remarkable but lower surges. What is important to notice is 
that in 2017 the banking systems of all the countries in the sample (except for Spain) had a 
higher leverage with respect to the one they had in 2007, therefore increasing their solvency 
risk. 
To conclude, after this cross-country analysis we can say that the Italian banking system 
suffered a lot during the crisis, and it experienced a strong reduction in its profitability: the 
three main problems we have identified in the previous paragraph were common to all the 
countries in our sample, but they hit the Italian banking sector more than they did with the 
other European ones. This happened basically due to two reasons: the first one is the business 
model adopted by Italian banks, which, as we have already said, focuses on money lending 
and deposit-taking activities and which relies poorly on digital resources. This, in turn, on one 
hand made Italian banks more vulnerable than the other ones to the effects of a a decrease in 
the NII due to the reduction of market interest rates, while on the other hand the poor 
digitization and the high number of branches and employees determines a high volume of 
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Figure 13 – Equity multiplier ratio 
 
Sources: own elaboration on OECD database. The ratio is computed as selected assets (including currency, 
deposits, debt securities and loans) to total equity (shares and other equity other than mutual fund shares). 
 
The second reason why Italian banks suffered more than the other ones in the sample is related 
to macroeconomic country-specific factors like the GDP growth rate, the unemployment rate 
and the inflation rate. During the last decade, the Italian GDP growth rate was one of the lowest 
compared to the rate at which the economy of the other countries grew and this lack of wealth 
creation made more difficult for firms and householders to pay back their debts, increasing the 
volume of NPLs; in addition, the burden of financial debts increased due to the low inflation 
rate registered. This created a sort of circularity: the financial crisis affected the real economy, 
worsening the GDP growth, while the stagnation in the real economy affected the profitability 
of Italian banks because of the increase in the number of NPLs, therefore reducing the amount 
of credit provided by banks to the economy and so limiting the GDP growth rate. The situation 
of the other European countries is heterogeneous: even though all of them suffered due to the 
crisis, the effects were different. Some countries, like Spain and Portugal, were heavily affected 
by the consequences of the increase in number of NPLs, while some others, like Germany, 
suffered more because of their volumes of operating costs. Given these results, we can say that 
the problems that affect Italian banks are common to the other ones in Europe, but what differs 
is their impact on profitability and the way banks reacted to these problems. What is important 
to point out is that while the banking sectors of the other countries were helped with public aid 
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State: this should be borne in mind when the results of the investigation are analysed. In the 
next Chapter we will investigate whether consolidation can be at least a partial solution to the 









Why to perform bank’s M&A 
This Chapter will briefly analyse the recent M&A activities that were performed in Europe 
during the last decade; in addition, a focus will be dedicated to the consequences that these 
operations had on the concentration levels in the European countries belonging to our sample, 
trying to estimate also the impact on competition. Finally, we will analyse the different forms 
of M&As, investigating the benefits and the different risks associated with each transaction 
type. 
 
2.1 Recent M&A activities in Europe 
Given their impact on the market structure, M&A activities are an important phenomenon that 
must be considered when performing an analysis of the European banking sector. In particular, 
to understand the current situation of European banks and to formulate realistic hypothesis 
about the future events that will occur in the European banking industries in the future, analysts 
must consider the trends, the number and the types of transactions, but also the countries 
involved during the recent M&A waves. Before starting the analysis, it is important to point out 
that even though M&As typically produce important effects in the structure of the market where 
they occur, they are not reasons for change themselves, but they are responses to other changes 
in the market and to other driving forces, like evolutions in information technology, 
disintermediation processes and the integration of international markets (European Central 
Bank, 2000). In addition, the consequences produced by M&A activities in the market are 
typically considered positive by regulators and supervisors: banks may respond in different 
ways to competitive changes and, to survive, they must find the most adequate response, 
therefore increasing the overall efficiency of the market.  
Until the 80s, the European financial industries were characterised by the strong presence of 
the State in the economy, which produced highly regulated markets and made government 
ownership a common tool of supervision and control, with the consequence that the market for 
corporate control was underdeveloped (European Central Bank, 2000). In addition, during this 
period, banking services were mainly local; therefore M&As were rarely the most efficient way 
to improve the efficiency of banks by changing their strategy or by consolidating the market. 
Starting the 80s and until the beginning of the 90s, a series of M&A activities occurred in the 
market of small European countries, like the Netherlands, leading to the creation of large 
38 
 
national banks ready to compete on a regional or national basis, greatly changing the banking 
market structure: this first M&A wave involved mainly institutions operating in the same 
financial sector, while universal banks and conglomerates will be born later on (Altunbas and 
Marqués, 2008). In particular, during this period, there were some privatisation waves in many 
European countries, so that many publicly owned banks were sold to private investors; at the 
same time, in some countries, like Germany, there was even a demutualisation process, so many 
institutions (and therefore many banks) converted from this organisational form to other private 
legal ones. The consequence of these two phenomena was an increase in the number of legal 
entities that, according to national laws, could take part to M&A deals (European Central Bank, 
2000). Finally, there was even a geographical expansion toward emerging markets by countries 
that had historical connections with those territories: for example, Italian, Portuguese and 
Spanish banks expanded in Latin America, while banks located in eastern Europe were not very 
considered for M&A deals.  
The financial integration of European countries has experienced an acceleration after the 
introduction of the Euro in 1999 and after the lowering of legal barriers, which had the aim to 
sustain the European banking unification (Deloitte, 2018). This, in turn, produced an 
acceleration in the number of M&A activities performed in the European banking sector, which 
was very high until the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007. Figure 14 shows the number 
of operations performed in Europe during the period 2005-2016, divided into categories 
(Deloitte, 2018): domestic (M&As between Euro area countries); cross border, which involves 
a Euro area target and a non-Euro area acquirer; outward, which means a Euro area acquirer 
buys a non-Euro area target (inside or outside the EU); inward, when a non-Euro area acquirer 
(inside or outside the EU) buys a Euro area target. Considering the graph, we can see how in 
the period 2005-2007 the number of M&As was much larger than in the subsequent period of 
crisis (2008-2016): in fact, during the first three years, the average number of all types of M&As 
that were carried out was 63, while from 2008 onwards the average was 32. This means that 
one of the effects produced by the crisis was a slowdown in the bank’s consolidation process: 
in particular, this was related mainly to M&As other than domestic operations, which have been 
the ones that were affected the least by the crisis during the entire period (even though they 
were characterized by huge volatility). Starting 2008 there was a reduction in the number of 
outward non-Euro area M&As, while from 2012 onwards the same happened for the number 
of cross border operations. There are different reasons which could explain this decline:  
• After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the regulatory framework aimed at avoiding 
concerns related to “too big to fail” institutions in the European banking system and 
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this, in turn, facilitated the maintenance of a fragmentation in the European banking 
market. In addition, a lack of integrated regulatory and supervisory structures at 
European level has hampered M&As among Euro and non-Euro area European banks: 
if, on one hand, the Banking Union and the Single Rulebook aim at creating a unified 
European banking market by harmonising and standardising the national ones, on the 
other hand there are still various and important differences between the single national 
regulations and supervisory mechanisms which prevent banks from performing M&As, 
like, for example, discrepancies in insolvency laws and in deposit guarantee schemes: 
therefore, investing in multiple jurisdiction represents a risk for banks due to regulatory 
obstacles and stringent compliance rules (Deloitte, 2018). 
• During the crisis, CEOs had defensive mindsets, so they were not interested in M&As 
as an alternative to expand their business but only as a way to defend their market 
position. This was shown even by CEOs’ and CFOs’ confidence indexes, which has 
started increasing only after 2014; although this increase, in 2017 they were still lower 
than the ones registered before the crisis (PWC, 2018). Expansion by acquisitions or 
expansion to new countries became a priority of European CFOs only starting 2018 
(Deloitte, 2018). 
• The crisis produced strong effects on bank’s profitability, as showed in the previous 
Chapter, therefore banks were more careful about performing M&A operations and 
more concerned about the sustainability and the risks of these kind of activities. In 
addition, even though the financial crisis could represent a good opportunity for healthy 
banks to acquire assets from institutions which needed to strengthen their liquidity or 
capital indicators, during that period acquirers had to face even stricter regulatory 
controls which have prevented banks from proceeding with acquisitions (Beltratti and 
Paladino, 2013). In fact, policy makers were worried about the impact of bank’s 
consolidation in the economy: on one hand, there is an effect generated by M&As in the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy (an increase in concentration is associated 
with an increase of loan interest rates in local markets, so hampering the pass-through 
from market to bank lending rates) while, on the other hand, there are no significant 
effect in the volume of loan supply to small and medium firms (Altunbas and Ibañez, 
2004). 
The consequence was that domestic M&A operations (even though they were relatively few in 
number) became the most diffused ones, in particular at a national level, between small regional 
banks. This widespread downturn in the number of M&A activities all over Europe during the 
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crisis produced an important effect on the degree of concentration in the European banking 
sector, which will be analysed in the next paragraph. 
Figure 14 – Bank’s M&As in Europe (number of transactions) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Deloitte (2018). M&As refers to transactions where the acquired stake of the target 
is more than the 20%. Transactions for which the amount paid is not reported are excluded. Cross border 
operations involve Euro area targets and non-Euro area acquirers. Inward refers to operations by non-EU or 
non-euro area EU banks in the Euro area. Outward refers to operations carried out by Euro area banks outside 
the Euro area. 
 
2.2 Concentration in the European banking system 
Two methods are usually applied to measure the degree of concentration in an industry: the 
concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The concentration ratio (CRn) is 
defined as the percentage market share of the n biggest firms in an industry (the size is typically 
measured in terms of total assets): for example, in the case of CR4, the ratio measures the market 
share of the four biggest firms in the industry. The concentration ratio is an important indicator 
for the regulator and for firm’s managers since, by describing the competitive structure of the 
market, it allows them to take optimal decisions respectively related to the market regulation 
and to the corporate strategy: in fact, depending on the degree of concentration, the regulator 
may decide to remove legal barriers to encourage new entrants or not to authorise an acquisition 
that would reduce too much the competition in the market, while managers may change their 
pricing policy depending on their market share. The ratio may range from values close to 0% 
(zero excluded, and in this case there is perfect competition in the market – this happens only 
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Depending on the value of the CRn, analysts can assume that the market has a different 
competitive structure: for 0%<CRn<40%, the market ranges from perfect competition to a weak 
oligopoly; for 40%<CRn<70%, the industry is an oligopoly; for 70%<CRn<100% the market 
ranges from a concentrated oligopoly to a monopoly.  
Even though the concentration ratio is simple to be used and it provides useful information, 
there are some shortcomings that must be kept in mind: first, the ratio does not provide any 
information about the size of the companies under analysis. When an analyst uses the CRn, he 
doesn’t know how the market shares are allocated among the n biggest firms, so he doesn’t 
know whether there are more oligopolistic firms or just one monopolist. In addition, the 
concentration ratio does not provide any information about the competitive behaviour of the 
firms in an industry: there is the possibility that an industry with a low concentration ratio is 
less competitive than another one with a bigger value. This is due to the fact that companies 
may decide to behave differently depending on the regulation and on the characteristics of the 
market; therefore, analysts must be careful when they study the degree of competition in an 
industry: they should perform some other complementary analysis to correctly estimate the 
structure of the market. Furthermore, the concentration ratio does not describe the reason for a 
change in its value: for example, in case of a decrease of the ratio, an analyst is not able to 
understand whether the reduction was due to a drop in the amount of the biggest firms’ assets 
or to an increase of the overall number of firms in the industry (so due to new entrants). Finally, 
the concentration ratio is generally used at a national level, but depending on the industry and 
on the regulation, firms may decide to sell their products in the national country market or to 
export them. Given that the market power of a monopolist is bigger in the case it sells its 
products in the local market rather than in the national or in global ones, same concentration 
ratios may not indicate the same monopoly power (Pavic et al., 2016). 
Figure 15 shows the values of the concentration ratio for the countries in the sample we have 
used in Chapter 1. The ratio was calculated considering the market shares of the five biggest 
domestic credit institutions (CR5, measured on total assets) for the period 2007-2017. Given the 
objective of our analysis, data are unconsolidated, which implies that only banking assets are 
considered, while consolidated statement of a financial group include also assets of non-
banking subsidiaries of the credit institution: this means that by using consolidated data, so 
considering all the assets of banking groups, results would probably be quite different. As we 
can see from the graph, the situation of European banking industries was very heterogeneous 
and there were huge differences from country to country. The German and the Italian banking 
sectors were the less concentrated ones before the crisis, with values equal respectively to 22% 
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and 33.1%, and they still are, even though they experienced an increase up to 29.7% and 43.4% 
in 2017. The Dutch, the Finnish and the Portuguese banking industries, instead, are still the 
most concentrated ones, as they were ten years ago, with values above 70%; in particular, while 
the Portugal’s and the Netherlands’ dynamics were stable, Finland’s one reached a peak in 
2014, with a concentration equal to 89.7%, and then it gradually reduced, reaching a value of 
73.5% in 2017. In the middle, there are the French and the Spanish banking sectors, which 
followed opposite trends: the French one is becoming less concentrated, moving from 51.8% 
of 2007 to 45.4% of 2017, while the Spanish one experienced a rapid increase in concentration, 
passing from a value of 41% in 2007 to 63.7% in 2017. From this analysis, we can see how, 
during the last ten years, the countries with the lowest values of concentration ratio (including 
Italy) were characterised by a consolidation process in their banking sectors, which was the 
result of M&A activities that were performed mainly by the biggest national banking groups: 
with respect to 2007, the five biggest credit institutions increased their market share by 22.7% 
in Spain, by 10.3% in Italy, by 7.7% in Germany and by 5.3% in Portugal. Pagano and Langfield 
(2014) explained that this increase was also driven by the way European authorities decided to 
face the problem of distressed banks during the years of the crisis: their solution was not to 
resolve these institutions, but to rescue them by encouraging mergers or acquisitions with the 
biggest domestic banks, without considering the effects on competition due to an excessive 
concentration.  
The information provided by the concentration ratio is useful not only to understand the 
dynamic of banking market’s concentration in a country, but also to predict what is going to 
happen in the next years: given the recent acquisitions performed by the biggest banking groups 
in Italy, for example, it is very unlikely that in the future they will perform new acquisitions 
since they have already employed a huge amount of resources, not only monetary ones. In fact, 
even though the price paid by the acquirer is usually very large, performing acquisitions is not 
only costly from a financial point of view, but also from an organizational one since, in order 
to be wealth generating, an acquisition must be followed by a complete integration of the target 
in the acquirer’s group to eliminate redundant costs and so to generate economies of scale. 
Therefore, given the low level of concentration in the Italian banking system, we can expect 
that future consolidation processes in Italy will be related to smaller banking groups, as 
expected by Oliver Wyman (2017) and KPMG (2018b), even because none of the Italian 
biggest banking groups has enough resources to acquire one of its peers. The same reasoning 
holds for Germany and France, while it is very unlikely that countries like the Netherlands, 
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Finland and Portugal will experience any national M&A activity in the near future, given their 
high concentration ratios.  
Figure 15 – CR5 of sample (percentage points) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Statistical Data Warehouse, European Central Bank. Based on total assets. 
 
The second indicator used to assess the degree of concentration in an industry is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, also known as HHI or HHI-score, which measures the size of all the firms in 
an industry and it provides information about the degree of competition within that market. It 






where MSi is the market share of the i
th firm and n is the total number of firms in the industry. 
HHI values range from 0 to 10,000, if market shares are expressed as percentages, or from 0 to 
1, in case market shares are expressed in fractions: for values lower 100 (or 0.01) the industry 
is highly competitive, so not concentrated; for values between 100 (or 0.01) to 1,500 (or 0.15) 
the industry is considered to be not concentrated; for values between 1,500 (or 0.15) to 2,500 
(or 0.25) the industry is moderately concentrated; for values above 2,500 (or 0.25) there is high 
concentration in the market. A general tendency is that smaller countries tend to have higher 
level of concentration ratios and vice versa. The Herfindahl index is generally preferred to the 
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not only the ones of the first n biggest firms in the industry, as the CRn does. In addition, it 
doesn’t capture only the dispersion of market shares but also the number of firms in the market, 
therefore it is size-sensitive with respect to the number of firms (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2015). 
Another shortcoming of the CRn ratio is that the decision about how many n largest banks to 
consider is arbitrary, while in the HHI there is not this problem since it considers the market 
shares of all the institutions. At the same time, the HHI seems to be more difficult to read, while 
the CRn is easier to be interpreted. For all these reasons, the HHI is used by supervisors, like 
the U.S. Department of Justice, during the scrutiny to decide whether a transaction breaches 
antitrust rules: in particular, if a transaction produces an increase in the HHI of more than 200 
points, deal makers have to prove that the acquisition/horizontal merger does not lead the 
industry toward a monopolistic scenario.  
The main shortcoming related to the use of the HHI is to define properly the market under 
analysis, both from a substitutability and from a geographical point of view: for what concerns 
the first problem, analysts should pay attention when they analyse firms that may offer more 
services, like banks. They should bear in mind that, using the same sample of institutions, they 
may get different results depending on which product/service market shares they consider and, 
at the same time, they should remember that commercial banks and investment ones are not 
substitutable for customers; therefore, in doing their analysis, analysts must consider which 
product they are studying and its substitutability with other ones to correctly draw their 
conclusions. For what concerns the second shortcoming, instead, analysts should choose a 
geographic scope when they define which market to analyse: for example, using the HHI, an 
industry may result to be an oligopoly on a national scale, but if the territory under analysis is 
restricted to a single region, it may result to be a monopoly. This depends on the importance to 
be local for the business: the more a product/service is regional, the more there is the possibility 
for its producer to be a monopolist on a regional basis.  
Figure 16 shows the values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the banking sectors of 
European countries during the last ten years. The HHI tends to follow the same dynamic of the 
CR5, leading to similar conclusions: Finland and the Netherlands are the countries in which the 
concentration of the banking sector is higher. Starting 2007, the Finnish banking industry 
experienced a huge increase in its concentration (with a peak of 3.700 in 2011) which lasted 
until 2014; from 2015 onwards, Finland experienced a reduction in the value of the ratio, 
reaching a value of 1.700 in 2017. For what concerns the Netherlands, instead, the value of their 
ratio was almost stable during the last ten years, even though it was quite high (around 2.100), 
signalling that even in this country the concentration in the banking industry was (and still is) 
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high, so that we can say it is an oligopoly. Italy, Germany, and France registered the lowest 
values among the countries in the sample. In particular, France experienced a slight reduction 
of its already low index during the decade: the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index of 
the French banking industry are low also due to the so called “popular savings products”, which 
form a large part of national deposits and which are sold by a limited distribution network (such 
as Crédit mutuel and savings banks). What influenced the extraordinary success of these savings 
products was a specific favourable fiscal treatment and the fact that their interest rate is 
determined directly by the government; in addition, the coverage of the territory by mutual 
banks (like Crédit Agricole) is very large in France, and this represents a clearly large advantage 
in the collection of deposits (European Central Bank, 2000). For what concerns the HHI of Italy 
and Germany, they registered a modest increase in the observed period: both these two trends 
where detected also by the concentration ratio. For what concerns the Spanish banking sector, 
during the decade it registered an important increase (+500 points) in its concentration: the 
reason of this surge were the domestic M&A activities that took place in the recent years, like 
the takeover of Banco Popular performed by Banco Santander (KPMG, 2018b). Finally, a 
relevant case is the Portuguese one: even though using the concentration ratio the Portuguese 
banking sector seemed to be very concentrated, looking at the HHI values related to the same 
period we can see how its level of concentration is not that high. This difference is easy to 
explain: on one hand, the assets of the four biggest banking institutions amount to about the 
70% of total assets in the Portuguese market, but on the other hand these banks have more or 
less the same market share, so the HHI detects a lower degree of competition in the industry. 
In fact, as the CR5, even the HHI takes the biggest institution mostly into account, since the 
importance of the market share of the biggest institutions is emphasized through the calculation 
of the index (the largest the market share of a company, the largest is its square and so the 
bigger its weight in the final ratio); the main difference, instead, relies on the fact that while the 
HHI studies the whole structure of the banking market, the CR5 considers only the market shares 
of the five biggest institutions in the industry: this is due to the fact that the HHI takes into 
account also the tail of the distribution, while the CR5 disregards all the institutions other than 








Figure 16 – Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
 
Source: own elaboration on Statistical Data Warehouse, European Central Bank. Based on total assets. 
 
This analysis showed the heterogeneity in terms of banking concentration among the European 
countries: some of them, like Portugal, Finland and the Netherlands, registered a high level of 
concentration in their market, which will likely discourage further national acquisitions during 
the next years, while the other ones, like Germany, Italy and France, are still fragmented and 
they are forecasted to experience new acquisitions among mid-tier banks. As highlighted by the 
European Central Bank (2000), there seems to exist a relationship between the size of the 
country, the level of concentration in its banking system and M&A activity: the smaller the size 
of the country, the higher tend to be the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index and the 
lower tend to be M&A activities. 
 
2.3 Types of M&A deals 
When two institutions are going to perform an M&A operation, the pattern they are going to 
follow depends on a lot of factors: the market sector in which they operate (as pointed out by 
literature, mutual banks, universal banks and publicly owned banks typically perform different 
types of transactions), the target’s and the acquirer’s size, but there are also some tax related 
issues that play an important role in the final decision. In addition, there are relevant differences 
not only from country to country, but even between the choices made by the different types of 
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factors affect not only the type of deal that institutions decide to perform, but also the legal form 
that is going to be adopted by the new entity after the operation. Many decisions can be taken 
in accordance with the strategy that the acquirer is going to follow: for example, as reported by 
supervisory authorities, many times the initial acquisition performed by a credit institution tends 
to be followed by a merger at a later stage, in particular when there is an overlap in terms of 
geographical or business areas; another possibility is the adoption of an holding structure, which 
is a relatively recent phenomenon, quite common in some countries like Finland and the 
Netherlands. Finding the best legal and organisational structure is probably one of the most 
important issues in a deal: in fact, it is very hard for managers and the other governing bodies 
to direct and control the processes and the activities of the group and to comply with legal 
requirements and rules when the organisational structure is not in line with the legal one, with 
the risk to destroy value for shareholders and to be castigated by authorities with fines and 
penalties. 
Supervisory authorities play a very important role during all the phases of the transaction 
process, in particular at the at the beginning of the operation: in fact, authorities have to ensure 
that, during the whole process, rules are respected and that a certain degree of transparency 
toward the market is guaranteed (both at a single company and at a consolidated level), but the 
most important role they have is to authorise M&A operations. The impact of M&As on the 
market structure (in terms of distortion of market competition and capacity – measured as the 
number of branches and employees) in which M&As occur is bigger the larger is the size of the 
institutions involved: this means that supervisory authorities consider M&As between small 
regional banks less critical than M&As between large national or international institutions 
(European Central Bank, 2000). In particular, in forecasting the possible consequences 
produced by M&A activities, authorities must consider that the degree of market concentration 
and the capacity of the industry are influenced by different factors and, therefore, the timing of 
consequences produced on them by deals is different: concentration is immediately affected by 
M&A transactions (since the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl index immediately capture 
the effect of a change in market shares), while capacity depends on the setting-up of new 
companies, on technology and labour market conditions, and all these factors produce their 
effect on it typically with a time lapse of two years, which is the time required by banks to 
rationalise their organisation after the operation (European Central Bank, 2000). In relation to 
these criticalities, institutions involved in the transactions need to receive, depending on the 
country, an explicit authorisation or a quasi-authorisation (in other terms an absence of veto by 
authorities) to proceed with the operation: to avoid possible problems after the announcement 
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of the deal, there are usually contacts between the institutions involved and supervisory 
authorities at an earlier stage, so that the compliance with the rules is previously assessed (in 
particular, requirements for the stability of shareholders, liquidity capital and large exposures 
issues are checked). For what concerns the structure adopted by the group after the transaction, 
instead, supervisory authorities typically require only a match between the legal and the 
organisational structure to guarantee an adequate exercise of the supervision and also to check 
the legal correctness of decision-making processes inside the company. Additional concerns for 
authorities, finally, are the position of minorities and the legal correctness of shareholders’ 
agreements, the correct treatment of goodwill and the consistency of resources to fund the 
acquisition. 
To provide a general but exhaustive view about the different types of M&A transactions we can 
use a matrix that considers as dimensions the industrial sector in which the two institutions 
operate and the number of countries involved in the transaction, as shown in Figure 17: 
Figure 17 – types of M&A deals 
 
Source: European Central Bank (2000). 
 
As we can see from Figure 17, we can identify four main types of transactions: domestic bank 
M&As involve credit institutions that operate in the same country, while international bank 
M&As are transactions that involve a European credit institution with one located outside 
Europe. Domestic conglomerations, instead, are M&As between a credit institution and a 
different financial institution (the typical case is the one with an insurance company) that are 
located in the same country, while international conglomerations are transactions between a 
European credit institution and a financial one located outside Europe, and they follow typically 
an international bank M&A which produced the benefit of extending the range of products sold 
in foreign markets to take advantages of cross selling possibilities. In case banks are located in 
different countries (international bank M&As) or in case they operate within the same country 
but they serve different regions or business areas (domestic bank M&As), it is less likely that a 
merger follows an initial acquisition; the same decision can be taken to maintain and exploit a 
recognised brand name, but in this case a partial solution can be to perform a merger only at a 
holding company level. 
 Domestic International 
Between credit institutions Domestic bank M&As International bank M&As 
Across sectors Domestic conglomeration International conglomeration 
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An important phenomenon that has rapidly increase in the banking sector during the last twenty 
years is the one of conglomerates, which consists “[…] in the process leading to the creation of 
groups of financial companies operating in different sectors of the financial industry” (European 
Central Bank, 2000, p.7). With this type of transaction, many banks expanded their business 
into investment management and assets management, which revealed to be very important 
activities during the recent financial crisis thanks to their revenue diversification component. 
Banks started expanding toward asset management during the late 90s: the fact that banks 
expanded toward other financial activities more than the other financial institutions did toward 
the banking activity can be explained considering the high barriers to entry of the banking 
industry, which are stronger than in the other financial activities like insurance; in addition, 
during the late 90s, the banking industry was already quite developed, more than the other 
financial sectors were. Today the most diffused type of conglomerates are the ones that involve 
the banking activities and the life insurance ones, with the benefit of linking institutions that 
are characterised by short-term liabilities and long-term assets (banks) with institutions that 
have an inverse term transformation (insurance companies); in addition, many times these kind 
of bank-driven operations are performed to optimise the use of different distribution networks 
and to acquire technologies or other relevant skills (European Central Bank, 2000). The degree 
of conglomeration depends on the size and the importance of the individual companies: the 
bigger the companies involved in this type of transaction and their relevance, the larger is the 
degree of conglomeration of the group. There are different ways by which banks may create a 
conglomerate (through M&As or by setting up a company in a different financial sector) and 
there are also different organisational forms that can be adopted (for example, the leading 
company, so the one that coordinates the others, can be a credit institution, a holding company 
or a different financial institution). In case the target of the bank is to offer different financial 
services, it may be achieved even exploiting other jointly organised ways:  
• Cooperation agreements, the less integrated forms, which are typically used in the case 
when banks sell insurance products labelled with the insurance company name;  
• Joint ventures, which are typically created by savings banks and cooperative ones with 
insurance companies to provide asset management, stock-broking and settlement 
activities together with insurance products, exploiting even marketing and distributional 
opportunities;  
• Banks may establish new subsidiaries to develop the insurance business and the 
products generated in this way are distributed through the bank’s network; 
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• A bank and an insurance company merge at a holding level or a bank acquires an 
insurance company, which becomes one of its subsidiaries; this is the most integrated 
form. 
The last two cases are particular types of conglomerates. In addition, many times these kinds 
of agreements are steps anticipating further integration that will involve ownership elements. 
In fact, many times the consolidation process in conglomerates is quite long and complicated, 
involving more steps: typically, the structure generated by the initial consolidation is very 
intricated due to information asymmetry and due to the difficulties in planning which double 
resources to eliminate; then, in a second moment, the organisational structure is simplified and 
managerial procedures are streamlined, simplifying the organisational and the supervisory 
lines, to eliminate market inefficiencies, so that the acquirer’s management obtains the approval 
of its shareholders and the resulting group complies with taxation and regulation restrictions 
(as we have already pointed out, supervisory authorities play an important role during the whole 
acquisition process). When groups are big and complex, the structure that is typically adopted 
is the one characterised by a holding company (European Central Bank, 2000). 
 
2.4 Benefits from M&A 
The fact that a market is characterised by M&A activities represents a health indicator of how 
the industry reacts to changing pressures and companies adapt to them; in addition, the 
possibility to perform acquisitions in the market represents a good opportunity for managers to 
increase the efficiency of their institutions (not only through acquisitions but also through 
divestitures) to boost shareholder’s value, which should be their ultimate goal. The rationale of 
M&A activities tends to be different according to the type of deal, the size of the institutions 
involved and the target region (European Central Bank, 2000). According to managers, the 
main reason to perform bank M&As is to increase profitability (European Central Bank, 2000): 
for what concerns domestic operations, this should be obtained through cost reduction benefits 
generated by economies of scale, while international conglomerates should increase the level 
of profitability through revenues-related benefits generated by economies of scope. What is 
important to notice is that, while forecasts on cost reduction are made looking at the combined 
historical annual costs, expected benefits in terms of revenues are estimated on the basis of 
cross-selling possibilities and expectations on market development: therefore, cost saving 
benefits tend to be more realistic and accurate than revenue improving ones. In fact, also for 
this reason, there seem to be quite big differences between the findings in the economic 
literature and the opinions expressed by banking managers: the latter expect higher benefits 
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from economies of scale than the ones register by researchers. There are different ways to 
explain this discrepancy: the first one is that banks, in performing their M&As, react to market 
changes rather than on the findings of econometric studies; this means that while M&As tend 
to be quasi-immediate reactions to changes in market conditions, econometric studies register 
these changes with a certain time lag, since they use past data and since it takes time (from two 
to three years) to complete the implementation of the acquisition, and so to measure that final 
returns on a quantitative basis. In particular, cost-related benefits seem to take more time to be 
achieved than cross selling ones, given that they require a higher degree of implementation 
between the two entities involved in the transaction to produce their effects. In addition, it is 
quite hard for econometrics to correctly estimate economies of scale generated by post-
acquisitions restructuring processes. The same discrepancy exists even in relation to economies 
of scope: even though it seems to be appealing to use an already existent wider distribution 
network to distribute a deeper range of products, econometric studies have failed to find the 
benefits that managers expect to achieve through M&A operations. What the literature supports, 
instead, is that domestic M&As among equally sized banks tend to improve significantly 
inefficiencies that are typical in the banking sector, leading to achieve the so-called X-
efficiency, which means that banks use the latest technology available in the market to 
transform inputs into outputs, minimising therefore the amount of waste produced during the 
process (European Central Bank, 2000). To achieve this result, it is not enough to focus 
diligently on the usage of inputs and outputs, but there is the need to revise and to reorganise 
the processes and the activities performed by the bank: for this reason, M&As represent a good 
moment to perform these kinds of operations and so efficiency seems to be an M&A driver 
better than economies of scale and economies of scope are.  
As we have already said, M&As are not driving forces themselves, but they are consequences 
produced by other driving forces and events that occur in the market: the most important ones 
are technological changes and improvements. In fact, technological changes, in combination 
with new outsourcing opportunities, alter the cost structure and the capacity of banks, requiring 
them to rationalise their production function (European Central Bank, 2000). Other important 
reasons that led (and continue to lead) banks to perform M&As are the disintermediation and 
internationalisation processes that took place in the recent years, together with the establishment 
of the European monetary union and the ongoing creation of the European banking union: all 
these happenings rapidly changed the market structure in which banks operated, requiring them 
to perform M&As to adapt preventively to the new market conditions. Typically, these 
operations are conducted on a voluntary basis to reduce the excess capacity but, in some cases, 
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they can also be promoted by governments and regulators (see Visco, 2018) as market-based 
rescue operations for institutions in financial distress: in this case, M&As tend to reflect the 
existing relations between the institutions involved. This kind of operations are generally 
preferred to the ones that involve authorities (and so taxpayers’ money) or deposit insurance 
schemes (bail in) since the market trust in the sector is not affected and market competition is 
not distorted, given that the market itself was eliminating the less efficient firms in the industry 
(European Central Bank, 2000).  
For what concerns the reduction of the excess capacity, banks tend to perform it by reducing 
the number of branches and employees. As we have already said, while the market 
concentration is immediately affected by M&As, it takes time to have visible consequences on 
banks’ capacity. Figure 20 and Table 1 show, respectively, the dynamic in the number of 
branches (per 1,000 adults) and the number of employees of the European banking industries 
belonging to our sample during the last decade. As we can see in Figure 20, there was a 
meaningful heterogeneity among the different countries, both in terms of the dynamic followed 
overtime and for what concerns the number of branches, but all the countries had a lower 
number of subsidiaries in 2017 than they had in 2007. Finland, Germany and the Netherlands 
are characterised by the lowest numbers of branches per 1,000 adults, with Finland and the 
Netherlands that experienced a reduction of about 15 branches during the last ten years, while 
in Germany the situation was almost stable. A reduction of the same amount occurred even in 
Italy, where the number of branches passed from 59 to 44, while in France it passed from 45 to 
37. The largest reductions were operated in Portugal and in Spain, where the number of 
subsidiaries was reduced by a half (from 62 to 30 and from 104 to 59 respectively). For what 
concerns the number of employees, Figure 21 shows the number of employees of each 
European banking sector in relation to the number of branches, to the number of private 
customers and to the number of firms they served in 2016. As we can see, even in this case 
there is a certain heterogeneity among countries, and the situation is even different depending 
on the way by which we measure the number of employees: if we consider the number of 
employees per branch, we can see how the Netherlands had the highest value, with 51 people 
working on a single branch on average, followed by Finland and Germany (19 and 18 
respectively), France, Italy and Portugal (11, 10 and 9), while Spain registered the lowest value 
(6). If we consider, instead, the number of private customers per employee, we can see how the 
situation is different: Finnish and Spanish employees managed the highest number of customers 
(248 and 231 respectively), followed by Italian, Portuguese and Dutch ones (203, 193 and 179), 
while French and German employees are the less efficient (160 and 125). Finally, if we consider 
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the number of firms served by each employee, we can see how Portuguese and Italian 
employees managed the highest number of firms (14 and 13 respectively), followed by the 
Spanish and the Dutch ones (12 and 11), while French and German employees served the lowest 
number of companies (7 and 3 respectively).  
In this case, it is harder to perform comparisons among the different banking sectors: in fact, 
given the same population size (and so an equal number of private customers to be served), due 
to the different level of industrialization, some countries are characterised by a larger number 
of firms that require more employees to be processed. Although the presence of this 
shortcoming, we can try to draw some conclusions: first, during the last decade, there was a 
general tendency all over Europe to reduce the number of branches. Given the crisis and the 
strong consequences that it had on banks’ profitability, considering the attempt of banks in 
trying to improve their efficiency through a reduction of costs and taking into account also the 
fact that (as described by Figure 14) the number of M&As has progressively reduced during the 
last ten years, we can say that the reduction of excess capacity (in terms of branches) was mainly 
driven by an attempt of reducing costs rather than by a consolidation process. In parallel, even 
though not displayed here, during the last ten years banks reduced also the number of 
employees: the reason for this trend can be extrapolated by the analysis of Table 1. Some 
countries, in particular Germany and France, are characterised by low number of customers 
(people and firms) per employee, meaning that there are too many workers in their banking 
industry: this leads to a low level of efficiency, given that to reach the same number of 
customers served, they have to pay a higher amount of salaries, therefore we can expect future 
actions to reduce the number of people employed in these banking sectors. The biggest 
reduction in the number of branches (and also of employees) was registered in the countries 
with the highest level of concentration, and so of competition, like Spain, Italy and France (the 
only exception was Germany), which are the countries that suffered the most for the reduction 
of interest rates. In addition, the need to reduce the number of branches and employees comes 
from technological changes: with the expansion of online services, like home banking ones, 
and with the increasing competition of Fintechs, banks need not only to revise their cost 
structure to find additional resources to be invested in their technological systems, but they need 
also to completely revise their organizational structure (their activities, their processes, their 
information flows) to provide the best products to their customers in the most efficient way. In 
this sense, M&As, in particular domestic ones, represent a good opportunity to operate these 
kind of activities: they can be seen as tools to perform a reduction of the excess capacity and to 
reach the X-efficiency, but the driving force that pushes banks toward this direction is a change 
54 
 
in market condition, in particular the development of new internet-related technologies. Even 
international M&As may have positive effects in reducing excess capacity but, as we will see, 
they produce larger effects in terms of risk diversification. 
Figure 20 – Commercial bank branches per 1,000 adults 
 
Source: own elaboration on World Bank database. 
 
Table 1 – Number of employees in 2016 




Firms per employee 
Italy 9.8 203 12.58 
Germany 18.3 125 3.38 
Spain 6.3 231 11.68 
France 10.9 160 7.34 
Finland 18.5 248 N.A. 
The Netherlands 50.7 179 10.95 
Portugal 9.1 193 14.41 
Source: own elaboration on World Bank data. 
Considering the classification of M&As described in Figure 17, we can make a summary of the 
benefits originated by each kind of transaction. These benefits are showed in Figure 18 and they 








2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Italy Germany Spain France Finland The Netherlands Portugal
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Figure 18 – M&A benefits 
 
Source: European Central Bank (2000). 
• Domestic M&As among small banks are performed with the aim to achieve the critical 
mass that allows survival and to explore synergies arising from size and diversification, 
therefore to exploit economies of scale operated mainly by costs reduction, which are 
typically realised through cutting the number of branches, the staff and overheads in 
central head-office functions such as information technology, macroeconomic and legal 
department. In some cases, these kinds of operations are performed even to avoid hostile 
takeovers. For what concerns, instead, domestic M&As between large banks, they are 
typically made to reach the critical size to survive in the market, but also to strategically 
reposition the institutions involved. Even in this case, costs savings generated by 
economies of scale may be an important objective, but in this type of transactions banks 
aim at increasing their market power and their capital base, therefore focusing more on 
increasing their revenues rather than reducing their costs. In fact, by increasing the 
concentration in the market (and so by reducing the competition on a regional basis), 
banks can charge higher interest rates on loans to small businesses and families and they 
can pay lower interest rates on deposits, therefore increasing an important source of 
revenues in their income statement. However, this was particularly true in the past: 
today, the development of new delivery channels and the competition of Fintechs are 
transforming financial products in commodities, increasing the competition on a local 
basis and therefore making local market more contestable by new players. In addition, 
as showed by recent econometric studies, the threshold to achieve the critical mass to 
be big enough for the domestic market is continuously increasing (European Central 
Bank, 2000). A decisive factor for success is achieving the possible rationalisations 
which, in some markets, have been limited due to labour market rigidities.  
 Within one country In different countries 
Between credit institutions • Economies of scale 
(cost reduction) 
• Reaching the critical 
mass 
• Rationalisation of 
administrative 
functions 
Across different sectors 
• Economies of scope 
(cross-selling) 
• Risk and revenue 
diversification 
• Economies of scale 
(cost reduction) 
• Economies of scope 
(cross-selling) 




• Cross border M&As produce diversification benefits in terms of income sources and 
risk: ceteris paribus, given that the business cycle is not synchronized across euro-area 
countries (leading to divergent country patterns of credit risk), operating in more 
countries makes an institution less vulnerable to shocks occurring in a single market 
(Schoenmaker, 2015). These transactions are performed also to reduce the excess 
capacity and for size reasons: in this case we are not referring only to the size of the 
institution itself, but also to the size of clients. Operating in more countries increases 
the value of the brand and the reputation of the institution, allowing the bank to find 
new and bigger customers to which charge higher fees and commissions: again, cross 
border M&As can be seen as a way to strategically reposition the bank to have access 
to new and larger markets. In addition, if a bank operates in more countries, it can follow 
and accompany the internationalisation and the consolidation of their clients, 
minimising the possibility of losing customers. Other reasons to perform cross border 
M&As are economies of scale and economies of scope: the formers are associated to 
cost reductions, even though in this case rationalizations are less simple than for credit 
institutions operating in the same market due to different regulatory requirements and/or 
market structures, and they are mainly related to the overlapping of administrative and 
back-office costs, but they are also related to an increase in revenues thanks to the new 
larger customer base; the latter, instead, are related to the distribution of the different 
financial products in the different countries, exploiting the pre-existent distribution 
network. In case of acquisitions in emerging markets, the bank operating in it has the 
possibility to benefit from the knowledge and capabilities of the bank operating in 
developed countries, increasing its cost and revenue efficiency. Finally, banks operating 
in concentrated markets may decide to perform cross border M&As because of the 
expectations that further national consolidation of already large institutions would 
trigger opposition from the supervisor, while, on the other hand, these kinds of 
acquisitions may be hampered by political reasons in host countries (but this is not very 
common).  
• Domestic conglomerates are mainly driven by economies of scope: with these 
operations, institutions want to exploit cross selling possibilities to sell their products to 
a larger customer base. Therefore, the main benefits are expected on the revenues side, 
implying an efficient use of the existing distribution channels, which are usually 
maintained separated to maximise benefits. In addition, by bringing together skills form 
two different sectors, the group expects to reach two objectives: to solve the 
disintermediation process with a solution internal to the conglomerate, capturing the 
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business that would otherwise be lost in the process, and to achieve income and risk 
diversification, which is achieved through a wider product range: because of the decline 
in interest margin and to the increase in competition, banks have entered into new 
businesses during the last decade. The typical example is the once of bancassurance 
with an ownership element, but banks are also moving toward long-term savings due to 
changes in the demography and favourable fiscal treatment that encourages investments 
in personal pensions. The European regulatory framework allows banks’ management 
to immediately react to changes in market conditions: in fact, managers may decide to 
enter into new industries that offer larger growth potential through M&As or even by 
setting up a new company and, if they succeed thanks to their caution and diligence, the 
whole group will benefit from the acquisition.  
• International conglomerates are pursued by institutions to reach economies of scope 
and to increase their size (even in this case the aim is not only to achieve the critical 
mass, but also to be attractive for large international clients). In addition, these types of 
conglomerates offer advantages also in terms of income and risk diversification which, 
in this case, are even larger than the ones of international M&As since they come not 
only from a different geographical distribution, but also from a broader product range. 
The aim is to increase revenues through cross-selling of strong brands. In this case, the 
possibility of costs reduction is really limited since overlaps of the administrative 
functions and distributive channels are minimal and institutions operate in different 
countries, with different rules and practices: generally, the only rationalisations are 
related to administrative functions that can be centralised, like information technology, 
strategic planning, risk management and marketing. These kinds of M&As are the most 
challenging for the management, since it’s very hard to achieve the efficiency and the 




Both the bidder and the target face some risks during M&A operations: the nature and the 
danger of these risks depends on the complexity of the transaction. There is a sort of spectrum, 
with domestic M&As among small banks that are the simplest deals, while international 
conglomerations represent the most complex ones. To avoid them, the management needs to 
pay attention to a large number of operational issues during all the acquisition process, starting 
from the moment when managers decide which target to acquire. The list of possible risks is 
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very long: they may arise during the integration of risk management systems or during the 
combination of customer and accounting systems, but also from the cultural differences of 
people working in different geographical regions; others may be generated by differences in 
terms of regulation and accounting/control procedures between different companies/business 
lines, which may create difficulties after the combination of institutions (European Central 
Bank, 2000). Another important risk related to conglomerates is the risk of contagion, the 
possibility that a shock in an institution of the group affects the group as a whole; finally, a risk 
that should not be underestimated before M&As is losing key staff or clients. These risks 
typically affect only the companies that are involved in the transaction, but their relevance 
should not be underestimated: given the negative effect they may have on institutions’ 
performances, regulators and supervisors must pay attention to the possible consequences that 
a mismanaged transaction may produce. In case of a bad deal, in fact, the performances of the 
new entity may be very worse than the previous existent entities and, through a contagion 
process, they may affect also institutions operating in the same country and, in extreme 
situations, given the current level of integration of the European banking sectors, even the 
industry at a continental level. To avoid these problems, there are two levels of control: one at 
a company level and one at a supervisory one. The control system at a company level is made 
of multiple elements: to minimise risks and to prevent possible problems, managers should 
allocate adequate resources to operational and strategic combination, but also to the integration 
of the two staffs; to avoid, instead, regulatory problems and legal disputes, they should perform 
friendly acquisitions rather than hostile ones. The control made by supervisors is characterized 
by a collaboration at an international level, and it mainly consists in limits on large exposures 
and on intra-group ones; in addition, supervisors tend to encourage the adoption of a holding 
structure, which may be beneficial in this context. 
Another important risk that managers face in a transaction is related to the achievement of the 
forecasted economies of scale: benefits related to cost saving are more realistic and accurate 
than the ones related to revenues improvement, given that they are based on historical annual 
cost analysis. However, these two types of improvements may result to be less successful than 
anticipated: the complexity of the operation and the subsequent rigid organisational structure 
of the new group may hinder the achievement of all the efficiency-related objectives, while 
regulatory issues and cultural clashes may, respectively, slow down the acquisition process 
(with a consequent waste of time and resources) and complicate the integration of the different 
organisational structures and company cultures, in some cases even causing a transaction to 
fail. In addition, typically, M&A operations affect capital adequacy, so that supervisors should 
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monitor the consistency of the required capital: acquisitions, in particular, are the case where 
capital adequacy is affected the most (unless fresh capital is injected). In fact, after the 
transaction, managers usually increase their focus on shareholders’ value creation, seeking for 
higher returns on equity, therefore increasing the capital leverage of the new group: the use of 
the existing resources and the use of the market to maintain capital adequacy ratios reduce the 
capital cushion for the withstanding financial difficulties. To avoid similar problems, 
supervisors prevent the practice of double gearing, so the use of capital to support both the 
parent company and the subsidiaries, and they impose strict regulations in the accounting 
treatment of goodwill. 
The role of the management is very important during all the phases of M&A operations: many 
times, the divergence between literature and manager’s expectation is due precisely to that. In 
fact, the management tends to overestimate its capability to successfully manage the difficulties 
arising from a combination process, like cultural clashes, underestimating the amount of 
resources (time and money) required to perform a value-creating transaction: domestic M&As 
involve important managerial challenges due to the increase in the complexity of the 
organisation, while cross sector and cross border operations, ceteris paribus, tend to be even 
riskier than the ones performed within the same country and sector. Typically, manager’s 
expectations tend to realise in the cases of acquisitions among small banks with the aim to 
reduce the excess capacity and to improve their cost-efficiency, while large scale deals seem to 
reach less frequently their performance target (even though a possible explanation can be the 
difficulty in measuring operational results with econometric tools due to their complexity). 
Another thing to consider is that there tend to be M&A waves in the market: for this reasons, 
managers’ decisions to perform a transaction may be influenced by the number of operations 
recently occurred in the market, therefore adopting the so called herding behaviour (which 
means that following the trend is considered safer than moving against the tide), or by 
investment bankers’ and consultants’ willingness to join the wave, with the risk not to take the 
a rational decision about what to do (in a wave, in fact, the price of target companies tend to be 
overestimated, increasing the overall risk of the transaction).  
The risks banks face in an M&A operation can be divided in two different groups: the ones that 
affect the companies in the period immediately preceding the operation (ex-ante risks) and the 
ones affecting the companies after the transaction (ex post risks). Figure 19 describes these risks 




Figure 19 – M&As risks 
 Within one country International bank M&As 
Between credit institutions Ex ante: pricing of the 
operation and strategic risk. 
Ex post: operational risk due 
to the integration, loss of 
clients and resource 
allocation risks. 
Ex ante: pricing of the 
operation and strategic risk 
(higher than on the left due to 
cultural differences), foreign 
exchange risk. 
Ex post: operational risk due 
to the integration, loss of 
clients and resource 
allocation risks (higher than 
the left due to different fiscal 
and accounting treatment and 
different reporting 
requirement 
Across different sectors Ex ante: pricing of the 
operation and strategic risk 
(higher than above), 
personnel frictions due to 
different remuneration and 
rules. 
Ex post: operational risk (due 
to integration), loss of clients 
and resource allocation risk 
(higher than above due to 
different fiscal and 
accounting treatment and 
different reporting 
requirement), reputation risk 
in the medium/long term. 
Ex ante: maximum risk: 
includes all the risks relating 
to domestic conglomeration 
and international bank 
M&As. 
Ex post: maximum risk: 
includes all risks relating to 
domestic conglomeration 
and international bank 
M&As. Reputation risk in the 
medium and long term. 
 
Source: European Central Bank (2000). 
• Domestic bank M&As: the main ex-ante risk is related to the correct decision about 
the maximum price the bidder should be willing to pay to conclude the deal: this amount 
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should correctly take into account the expected future income generated by the target 
company once integrated with the bidder. In fact, in case these benefits are 
overestimated and the fixed price does not include a safety cushion for possible errors, 
the bidder (and so the whole group) risks to incur in a loss that could affect the 
profitability of the new company for many years, affecting the shareholders’ value. The 
most relevant ex-post risks, instead, are related to operational issues like the integration 
of personnel, the combination of information and risk management systems and 
procedures, internal control procedures and the integration of the day-to-day customer 
and accounting systems; usually these problems are different depending on the type of 
transaction: in case of a merger there is the need to fully integrate information 
technology and accounting systems to create a unique platform, while the same is not 
required in the case of an acquisition. To reduce these types of risk, the management 
should allocate adequate resources not only to find but also to prevent issues and it 
should also guarantee a high degree of transparency to detect possible problems: once 
problems are identified, the management must react to avoid inactivity and 
malfunctions. Other possible risks can be related to the coexistence of below top-level 
managers in the new entity: during the reorganisation of the hierarchical structure, 
battles for responsibility among managers are very usual, and they may lead to a loss of 
key personnel. In any case, given that in this types of transaction the two institutions 
operate in the same country and they sell similar or identical products, operational and 
strategic issues should be known by the management and so they should be manageable: 
in case the company focuses too much on these types of issues, allocating too many 
resources, there is a risk of neglecting all the other possible problems because of an 
exacerbated inward orientation, therefore losing clients and market shares. 
• International bank M&As: ex-ante risks are the same of domestic bank M&As, but 
in, this case, it is even harder to deal with them due to the cultural barriers/differences: 
for example, for what concerns the strategic risk, managers of the bidder company 
operating in one country usually do not have the same knowledge about the market, 
regulation, taxation and practices of the country where the target operates, i.e. licensing 
procedures and documents requested in that connection. In some cases, these different 
practices may represent an advantage for the company, but such differences are not 
considered motives for M&As themselves. In addition, in this case fixing the correct 
price to acquire the counterpart may be even harder, given the additional difficulties in 
estimating cost-related and revenue-related benefits. In terms of ex-post risks, 
operational issues of international bank M&As are often greater than the ones of 
62 
 
domestic bank M&As: institutions operating in a foreign country are subject to different 
fiscal and accounting treatment and may have diverse reporting requirements. Moving 
to the demand side, consumers, after the transaction, may initially not regard a bank 
coming from a different European country as “domestic”, and in some cases they may 
not consider it as a safe institution to which they can entrust their money: only when 
this resistance disappears, a truly integrated retail banking market emerges. Corporates, 
in particular the largest ones, tend to adapt faster and to select their main banks looking 
not only at the services they offer, but also at countries served, since banks may provide 
an important support in the internationalisation process of firms (Schoenmaker, 2015). 
Finally, the negative impact of an eventual loss of key personnel due to staff battles may 
be a larger, given the importance of knowledge and experience when dealing with a 
different market and a different culture.  
• Domestic conglomerates: Entering in a new business area through a conglomeration 
gives rise to new challenges due to many different reasons: differences in corporate 
culture, in market regulations and in customers’ purchasing behaviours represent 
important issue that should be faced by managers. Ex ante risks are the same arising in 
the case of domestic banks M&As, and they are related to the setting of a sustainable 
price and to strategic risks, but they are amplified because of the entering in an unknown 
industry. There are not only obvious differences in terms of corporate culture and in the 
company’s organisation, but many times there are also differences in terms of staff rules 
and remuneration schemes, which can originate frictions between the two groups of 
personnel even before the transaction, leading to possible losses in terms of human 
resources. Ex-post risks of domestic conglomeration are related to managing different 
business lines and corporate cultures, but also to manage different fiscal and accounting 
treatments and reporting requirements. An additional issue in conglomeration processes 
is the reputation risk, which is the risk that a failure in one enterprise may lead to a 
deterioration in the reputation of the whole conglomerate: in fact, customers may decide 
to terminate their relationship with the of the conglomerate because of the mistakes or 
the disagreements they experienced with one of the companies belonging to 
conglomerate. 
• International conglomerates: they are the most complicated and the riskiest type of 
transaction: they suffer all the risks (ex-ante and ex-post) we have analysed in domestic 
conglomerates and international M&As, since managers must deal with both different 
business areas and different countries, bringing the strategic and price risks to the 
maximum level. Due to the two dimensions interested by the transaction, the ex-post 
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the operational risk increases, given the harder and more complex integration process 
required to combine the different companies. Even in this case there is a high reputation 
risk and avoiding losses in terms of key personnel figures is very important to 
successfully conclude the deal. 
Even personal interests of the management play an important role in transactions, and not 
always a negative one (European Central Bank, 2000): in fact, if the performance, the size and 
the brand power of the institutions where they work were not considered personal interests by 
managers, M&As and the other structural changes that occur in the market would be far rarer. 
The prestige coming from an employment in a bigger institution, the possibility of getting ahead 
and the reputation of concluding an important deal increase the motivation of the top 
management which, ceteris paribus, raises the probability of concluding the M&A through 
successful cooperation. This effect can be transferred also to employees which, however, are 
more interested in their job security rather than on the size and the prestige of their new 
employer. But personal interests may also have negative effects on the transaction: they can 
block the M&A to protect their own position that would be otherwise at risk. In addition, turf 
battles among managers due to their personal interests, which are quite common in areas where 
responsibilities have not been allocated yet, lead to an inefficient use of resources. In some 
cases, personal interests of managers may even prevail to the ones of shareholders, leading to 
an inefficient corporate governance. In M&As between small institutions, typically, managers 
pursue their own interest of maintaining, at any cost, their position in an independent enterprise, 
while in the case of an M&A between large institutions the management is usually tempted to 
close the deal in order to increase the size of the company in which they work, and so to increase 
their prestige, without considering properly the strategic and the operational fitting of the two 
institutions: this situation is very risky when the target company is in financial trouble or 
distress and its owners are interested in cashing in more than in the integration of the two firms. 
Many times, in these situations, some unsophisticated and unskilled shareholders may add 
pressure on management to close the deal since they perceive M&As as transactions full of 
opportunities, underestimating the possible risks they may generate. Finally, we must consider 
that performing M&As absorbs company’s resources during the whole process, in particular 
acquirer’s ones, which should study the acquisition to understand whether it is value generating 
and then it should perform it properly to maximise the efficiency of the new entity. This may 
limit the acquirer bank’s dynamism during the acquisition period and it could amplify the 
potential problems generated by a downturn in the business cycle. 
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M&As and the subsequent consolidation of the market may increase systemic risk, given that 
the increase in firms’ size raises the proportion of firms whose failure may carry potential 
systemic risk (European Central Bank, 2000). At the same time, systemic risk may also increase 
due to the enlargement in the scope of firms’ activities following consolidation, in particular in 
the cases of domestic and international conglomerates: in fact, institutions that perform a large 
variety of activities usually become more complex and so less transparent to markets and 
regulators, therefore more difficult to be monitored and controlled by shareholders and 
supervisors. However, although the presence of these systemic risk-related problems, 
improvements in the internal risk management and control technologies, as well as in risk-
monitoring technologies by markets and regulators, may offset them, producing benefits both 
for the market and for shareholders; in addition, consolidation allows banks to diversify risks 





The role of strategic similarities 
We first illustrate the different approaches that can be used to estimate the impact that mergers 
have on the performances of the institutions involved in a transaction. After the literature 
review, we will focus on the important role of strategic similarities in bank M&As. Then, with 
the use of a selected dataset, we will build an econometric model to examine the impact of 
strategic similarities between the bidder and the target on post-merger performance.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
M&A activities are the result of changes in the market structure resulting from improvements 
in information technology, globalisation of real and financial markets, increased shareholders 
pressure and financial deregulation (Altunbas and Marqués, 2008): in this sense, we can say 
that M&As are part of corporates’ strategy, which is proactively designed by firms to adapt 
themselves to the current characteristics of the environment in which they operate 
(Ramaswamy, 1997). Given that technology is continuously improving, globalisation is an 
ongoing phenomenon and European countries are still very heterogenous in terms of banking 
concentration levels, we can say that M&As will continue to affect the European banking 
market for many years to come (European Central Bank, 2004). Even though M&A operations 
may generate a lot of benefits for the institutions involved, therefore increasing the value of the 
group and so the shareholders’ wealth, it is important to bear in mind that they bring with them 
a lot of risks too, which, at the end, may damage the whole industry through a contagion effect. 
For this reason, it is important to understand how to program and how to implement acquisitions 
to maximise shareholders’ value and, at the same time, to minimise risks.  
In the corporate strategy literature there is a general consensus about the fact that product and 
market relatedness are necessary but not sufficient conditions to perform a value creating 
acquisition (Lubatkin, 1987): the reason is that this relatedness could lead, with a high 
probability, to the exploitation of synergies in terms of an increase in revenues or a reduction 
of costs, without considering other possible sources of synergies like similar organisational 
structures or the management and the corporate culture (Altunbas and Marqués, 2008). For 
what concerns, instead, the M&A literature, during the last decades it was characterised by a 
large number of empirical studies that tried to understand what factors drive the performances 
of new entities generated by M&A transactions. These studies were performed mainly in the 
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US banking system, where the process of financial deregulation started earlier and so it has 
already produced its effects in terms of consolidation. To study the consequences of 
consolidation processes on banks’ performance, researchers developed two different 
methodologies: the first one is the so called “event study methodology”, which is typically 
based on the study of changes in stock market prices before and after the announcement of a 
deal, therefore trying to estimate, starting from abnormal stock market returns, the shareholders’ 
value generated by the transaction for the owners of all the companies involved. The assumption 
that researchers make when they use this approach is that excess returns, measured during a 
certain period of time including the announcement date, explain the value creation of a market 
transaction. Following this approach, researchers found that, on average, the operations carried 
out in the US produced mixed or negative results (see Beitel and Schiereck, 2006; Piloff and 
Santomero, 1998; Caruso and Palmucci, 2008): typically, target’s shareholders are the only 
ones that gain from the acquisition at the expenses of the bidder’s ones (Altunbas and Marqués, 
2008).  
The second methodology, instead, divides the banks population in sub-samples of institutions 
that share some characteristics, trying then to estimate the effect of common and non-common 
peculiarities on the performance of the new post-acquisition entity, therefore estimating the 
value creation or the value destruction of the different transaction types. This second 
methodology is based on the evidence provided by corporate finance studies, which sustain that 
companies focusing on their core business increase their profitability, and so the value creation 
for their shareholders. By applying this approach in the US banking market, researchers found 
out that geographic diversification and mergers among banks with different product strategies 
may destroy shareholder’s value (Amihud et al., 2002), while DeLong (2001) and Cornett et 
al. (2003) argue that only the bidder companies which focus on geography and product-
relatedness are able to avoid value destruction. Finally, according to the study of Deng and 
Elyasiani (2005), geographic diversification reduces bank’s risk without impacting on 
profitability. 
There is a group of studies which measures the consequences of M&A operations on 
profitability using accounting ratios, like ROE, and productive efficiency indicators, like 
economies of scale. Even though one of the main reasons why managers seek for possible M&A 
opportunities is the increase of profitability through the enhancement of efficiency, some 
researchers have demonstrated that this improvement is rarely achieved (see Piloff, 1996). A 
possible explanation to this fail in finding efficiency improvements can be the time required by 
some efficiency gains to materialize: if some of them, like the ones associated with risk 
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diversification, are typically visible in the short run, some others, like cost benefits related to 
economies of scale or revenue increases due to economies of scope, may require a longer time 
to materialise (Altunbas and Marqués, 2008). Even with the use of this methodology, in the US 
market profitability seems not to be affected by consolidation (Rhoades, 1994). For what 
concerns studies related to European banks, researchers found out that M&As increase the stock 
market valuation and the performances of the firms involved, in particular in the case of 
products-focused operations (Beitel and Schiereck, 2006; Beitel et al., 2004). What is important 
to point out is that just few papers studied how the relatedness of the institutions involved in 
the transaction affects the performance of the new entity: the most important studies of this kind 
were performed by Ramaswamy (1997), and by Altunbas and Marqués (2008). 
 
3.2 Literature review 
Among the most important studies about the consequences of M&As into bank’s efficiency and 
profitability, Harrison et al. (1991) contributed in extending the definition of product-
relatedness by including different strategic variables in the analysis of similarities. In particular, 
they used the allocation of resources to measure the R&D intensity, the administrative intensity, 
the capital and the debt intensity so that, by making comparisons among institutions, they could 
measure their relatedness. The importance of similarities is related to the possibility of 
exploiting synergies, but with their study they found out that also some dissimilarities are 
correlated with positive post-acquisition performances: they explained this result with the 
possibility that these differences strengthen the bidder’s competencies, which could therefore 
be used to exploit new opportunities offered by the environment. This study was important to 
overcome the old product-market relatedness approach, redefining the concept of strategic 
similarity and the way by which it can be measured. 
Chatterjee et al. (1992), and Datta et al. (1991) conducted researches about the relevance of 
strategic and managerial elements in M&A deals. The first group of researchers focused on the 
importance of the “cultural fit” between the bidder and the target, finding out that, for example, 
when two companies involved in a transaction share the same risk-taking attitude and the same 
innovation and autonomy orientation, shareholders get higher returns than in the case of cultural 
mismatches. The second group, instead, focused on the role of managerial similarities in 
M&As: according to their study, for example, when the two managements do not share the 
same decision-making approach or in case they have different risk propensity, post-acquisition 
performances tend to be lower since the aggregated management is not able to act as a unique 
subject, not being able to exploit potential synergies to create shareholders’ value.  
68 
 
Piloff and Santomero (1998) analysed both types of methodologies, pointing out their strengths 
and their drawbacks. They argued that by using accounting data, researchers may estimate, on 
a quantitative basis, the accounting performances of the institutions involved; in addition, 
accounting data are easy to be obtained. The users of this method support the use of this method 
since accounting data measure the current and actual performance of an institution and they are 
not influenced by investors’ expectations. At the same time, however, by providing a picture of 
the current situation, accounting data are inaccurate in an economic sense, which means they 
reflect historical values and not the current market valuation. Furthermore, changes in 
accounting values may not be related only to M&As, and many times it is not that simple to 
identify the possible sources of their changes. For what concerns the evaluation of a transaction 
using stock market reactions, Piloff and Santomero (1998) argued that the use of market values 
better estimates the value generated or destroyed by corporate consolidation. In addition, they 
promote the use of value-weighted sum of bidder’s and target’s abnormal returns rather than 
the study of abnormal returns individually, since in this latter case it is more complex to 
distinguish between the combined effect on abnormal returns of wealth transfer and 
consolidation. The main shortcomings in the use of this method are the assumption of perfect 
information and the decision about the time span during which the study is performed. To 
conclude, they argued that there seems not to be a statistically relevant increase in value or in 
performance after M&As, while target’s owners tend to gain at the expenses of bidder’s ones. 
Since M&As continue to be performed, probably both these two techniques are not 
sophisticated enough to appreciate the concrete benefits of deals. 
Caruso and Palmucci (2008) used the event study methodology to estimate the effect of M&A 
deals. In particular, they thought that it was better to use rumours date rather than the 
announcement day as starting point to measure the effect on value produced by a transaction 
since part of the change in the stock value is already discounted at the leakage date: this simple 
change in the calculation method may turn the overall value creation from negative to positive, 
therefore better explaining the benefits produced by M&As. In addition, from their analysis 
related to the Italian market, they found out that in our country deals are driven more by personal 
interests than by value creation. 
Fridolfsonn and Stennek (2005) argued that by analysing stock market values few weeks before 
and after the acquisition, target’s shareholders result to benefit from the transaction, while the 
bidder’s ones generally break-even, so that the compounded value generation for all the 
shareholders involved appear to be positive. By looking at the studies that use accounting data, 
instead, the entity resulting from the transaction is less profitable than the other companies in 
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the industry with which it has to compete, which means the new entity produces less value for 
its shareholders than the other companies do. What Fridolfsonn and Stennek (2005) pointed out 
is that these two approaches may lead to opposite conclusions if used to analyse the same 
transaction: this difference can be explained by the market reaction to the deal. If the transaction 
was a surprise (so if there were no leakages), the change in market values of shares reflects the 
change in profitability, while if the transaction was anticipated (it means there was a leakage), 
the change in price reflects the change in the true value of companies, since the market has time 
to understand the merge dynamic. For this reason, even though the two methodologies are many 
times considered to be substitutes, they should be used together since they are complementary.  
Beitel et al. (2004) tried to identify the drivers of abnormal returns for the target’s, the bidder’s 
and the new entity’s shareholders analysing the European banking market. Their results showed 
that many drivers that were previously identified in the US market are valid also for European 
banks, with the consequence that the stock market reaction to M&A announcement can be, at 
least partially, forecasted: from their observations, successful bidders tend to choose small 
inefficient fast-growing targets that experience poor stock returns. In particular, capital markets 
seem to prefer product-related and focused transactions rather than the ones made with the aim 
to diversify bank’s sources of revenues. In addition, in contrast with the findings of some US-
related studies, institutions that perform more M&A operations tend to create less shareholder’s 
value than the ones that perform M&As occasionally, suggesting that European managers 
pushing for acquisitions are probably motivated by objectives different from shareholders’ 
wealth generation.  
DeLong (2001) tried to identify which types of mergers tend to create value for shareholders, 
according to their abnormal returns. She classified mergers depending on their focus or 
diversification with respect to the dimensions of activity and geography. She found out that 
while M&As pursued with a diversification objective do not create value, the ones among 
similar institutions increase stockholder’s value by 3% on average. In addition, some other 
factors seem to influence the returns of the post-acquisition entity, like the relative size, agency 
costs and the type of corporate governance. Even though diversification-related M&As seem to 
be undesirable, the author points out that there can be a possible explanation to this result: stock 
prices reflect market’s expectations about future cash flows, and the increase in future flows 
generated by diversification strategies may be more difficult to be forecasted, leading to the 
underestimation of post-acquisition cash flows.  
Cornett et al. (2003) used abnormal returns to study the consequences of M&As on banks’ 
returns: in particular, they found out that M&A operations performed with the aim to diversify 
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revenue sources earned negative abnormal returns, while focused bank acquisitions tended to 
be neutral in terms of value creation. In addition, authors analysed also the influence of 
corporate governance variables on transactions, and results suggested that they have more 
consequences on diversifying acquisitions rather than on focusing acquisitions. Even in this 
case, the main determinant of lower performances in diversified entities seemed to be agency 
costs at managerial levels: in fact, mechanisms aimed at reducing the conflict between managers 
and shareholders seemed to be more effective in focusing acquisitions rather than in 
diversifying ones, with the consequence that, to be value maximising, this type of transactions 
must be controlled and supervised more by regulators to balance the lower efficacy of corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
Piloff (1996) combined both the accounting data methodology and the event study methodology 
(related to stock market reaction to M&As announcements) to study how accounting and market 
data influence the return on acquisitions. In addition, the author studied how some 
characteristics like the size, the location and the operating performances of the institutions 
involved influence both accounting results and abnormal returns: low target profitability, high 
target and acquirer total expenses and big target size are correlated with after-transaction 
performance improvements and bigger abnormal returns. In particular, improvements in 
accounting performances are positively correlated with the amount of total expenses, while the 
increase of abnormal returns, instead, is positively correlated with the difference in total 
expenses: the fact that there is a correlation between abnormal returns and opportunities for cost 
reduction is in line with the belief that mergers increase the efficiency of the institutions 
involved. Finally, the author concluded that the statistically insignificant correlation between 
abnormal returns and performance indicators signals that market expectations are not positively 
correlated with post-merger related improvements. 
Ramaswamy (1997) focused his attention on the factors that determine whether an acquisition 
is going to be successful or not. To do so, he analysed the differences within M&A operations 
of the same type and, in particular, he focused his attention on acquisitions. He exploited the 
deregulation that took place in the US banking market during the 80s, which led to a subsequent 
M&A wave. His methodology was very interesting and, given we have taken a cue from it, we 
will briefly analyse it. His sample included all the banks that were involved in an M&A 
operation during the period, but he excluded the ones that were involved in more than a 
transaction in a time span of three years (this to isolate the consequences of a single operation). 
To be included in the sample, both the target and the bidder must have been an independent 
entity at the time of the merger. He then classified the strategic orientation of the organizations 
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involved looking at resource allocation made by the management: he identified and measured, 
through the use of some ratios, five different areas that could be considered by managers to 
achieve a competitive advantage: market coverage, operational efficiency, emphasis on 
marketing activity, client mix and risk propensity. Following the approach of Drazin and Van 
de Ven (1985), he built different scores that were used as independent variables, which were 
regressed one at a time against the change in performance following the merger. Results showed 
that similarities in resource allocation patterns between the target and the bidder firms (taken 
as proxy for similar strategies) have a positive influence on post-merger performances, while 
strategical dissimilarities (in particular on risk propensity, operational efficiency and client mix) 
negatively affect the post-merger performances. He explained this result in the following way: 
when the bidder bank imposes different cost control and monitoring systems to its target, it may 
damage the target’s resource allocation pattern necessary to implement its operations, damaging 
its value creation; serving different client mix doesn’t create value for shareholders since the 
two merged companies are not able to generate enough synergies to increase the new entity 
performances; finally, mergers between firms with different risk propensity do not generate 
shareholders’ value due to the different corporate and management culture. An ambiguous 
relationship, instead, was found between performance and market coverage. 
Altunbas and Marqués (2008) examined the role of strategic similarities on post-merger 
performance. They built their model starting from the Ramaswamy’s one (1997): they improved 
it by using accounting data as similarity indicators, assuming therefore that accounting financial 
reports are, to a reasonable extent, the reflection of corporate strategy decisions. In addition, 
they performed their analysis studying European banking transactions and they conducted their 
analysis using two different samples: one included domestic acquisitions and one included only 
cross border deals. According to their study, in Europe M&As are typically carried out by large 
efficient banks which tend to acquire relatively smaller and better capitalised institutions with 
more diversified sources of revenues; in addition, in contrast with the US literature, they found 
out that post-acquisition performances of bidder companies tend to be better than the pre-
acquisition ones, in particular in the case of cross border M&As. For what concerns strategic 
similarities, they found out that, on average, strategic relatedness tends to be performance 
improving, in particular in the case of domestic transactions: in detail, relatedness in deposit 
strategies and in efficiency tends to be value enhancing both in the case of domestic and cross 
border acquisitions. In addition, for what concerns domestic M&As, dissimilarities in terms of 
loans, earnings, costs, deposits and size strategies tend to reduce the profitability of the new 
post-acquisition entity, while, in the case of cross border transactions, they found out that while 
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dissimilarities in terms of loan and credit risk strategies are correlated with higher post-
acquisition performances, differences in capital and cost structure tend to negatively affect the 
profitability. Therefore, they concluded, integrating institutions with different strategic 
orientation is usually complicated. 
 
3.3 Research objective 
There are a lot of possible forms of acquisitions (horizontal, vertical, conglomerate) among 
which managers can choose when they perform a deal, and each form of acquisition has 
different consequences on the new post-acquisition entity, both in terms of efficiency and 
profitability. The literature is full of works about this issue: in our review we illustrated some 
of the approaches that have been used in the past, in order to understand what is the acquisition 
form that maximises the shareholders’ value in every situation, while a very little attention was 
dedicated to the differences within each type of transaction. The work made by Ramaswamy 
(1997) and the subsequent evolution operated by Altunbas and Marqués (2008) shed some light 
on the determinants of performing acquisitions within operations of the same type. In particular, 
they considered the relationship between the pre-merger accounting characteristics of the banks 
involved in the transaction and their post-acquisition performance to understand the role of 
strategic similarities in banking M&As: this is very important since banks are firms, and firms 
are different one with respect the others since each one has its own vision, mission and corporate 
strategy which are decided by its management. In particular, corporate strategy is very 
important since, by driving companies during their decision-making process, it determines the 
failure or the success of a company.  
We then decided to focus our attention on the factors that determine whether  horizontal 
acquisitions are going to be successful or not: in doing so, due to some limitations in the use of 
databases which didn’t allow to analyse the European market, we analysed some deals that took 
place in the US market during the year of the financial crisis (2008-2016), in order to understand 
whether the determinants of a successful acquisition identified by Altunbas and Marqués (2008) 
are still valid. 
From a theoretical point of view, our model differs from the ones that were previously 
illustrated in the literature review due to the variables used to study the role played by strategic 
similarities in M&A operations: the relationship between some of the independent variables we 
have used in our model, like CFL, and the change in performance ΔROE, was never studied 
before. For this reason, our work contributes to the literature by offering an alternative set of 
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independent variables to explain the influence that strategic similarities have on post-merger 
performances, allowing us to determine which target’s characteristics bidder should be 
interested in when they perform acquisitions. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
To perform our analysis, we started from the model of Altunbas and Marqués (2008) which 
related the changes in performance (due to a merger) to a set of strategic indicators and to a set 
of control variables. This model was itself an evolution of the one created by Ramaswamy 
(1997), who studied the same relationship in the US market using less specific and less 
numerous indicators. The key characteristic of the model created by Altunbas and Marqués 
(2008) is the way they used accounting data to estimate the corporate strategy followed by the 
target and the by bidder company: by adopting the approach of corporate strategy researchers 
(see Dess and Davis, 1984; Zajac and Shortell, 1989), they estimated the strategy followed by 
each firm in their sample by analysing the resource allocation in their financial statements. The 
main assumption of Altunbas and Marqués’ model is the following: the organization’s strategy 
can be extrapolated looking at its financial statements, since these documents are the result of 
the decisions taken by the company management. The consequence is that, when two 
companies have similar or identical resource allocation patterns, they can be considered to have 
the same corporate strategy. To measure the strategical similarities between the target and the 
bidder, we use the distance metric proposed by Drazin and Van de Ven (1985), which is the 
following: 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑘 = √(𝑋𝐵,𝑖,𝑘 − 𝑋𝑇,𝑖,𝑘)2 
where SIi,k is the similarity index of the k
th variable for the ith merger, while XB,i,t and XT,i,k are 
scores of the target Tn and the bidder Bn. The larger is the value of SIi,k, the more the accounting 
ratios of the two companies differ and so, based on our assumption, the more the two companies 
differ in terms of their strategies: the goal of our analysis is to estimate the impact of strategic 
similarities on the performance of the post-acquisition new entity and, in doing so, we will study 
the relationship between the change in performance ΔROE and strategic indicators. Table 2 






Table 2 – Independent variables: strategic indicators and control variables 
Indicator Symbol Formula 
Revenues diversification OORTA Other operating income to average assets 
Efficiency CTIR Cost-to-income ratio 
Capital adequacy EQTA Equity to total assets 
Loan ratio NLTA Net loans to total assets 
Credit risk LLPNIR Loan loss provision to net interest revenues 
Liquidity LADSTF Liquid assets to deposit & short-term funding 
Liquidity NLTTDP Net loans to total deposit and borrowings 
Capital structure CFL Capital funds to liabilities 
Bidder performance PREROE 2 years weighted average ROE of the bidder 
Relative size RSIZE Target’ total assets on bidder’s total assets 
 
The first strategic indicator we use in our analysis is related to earnings diversification: as we 
have already explained in Chapter 1, the most traditional source of earnings for banks is 
represented by net interest revenues. If a bank wants to diversify its sources of revenues, which 
means it wants to offer a wider portfolio of products, it is very likely that its ratio between other 
operational revenues and total assets (OORTA) increases. This strategic indicator is expected 
to have a positive relationship with the change in performance (ΔROE) since it may allow banks 
to have access to new sources of revenues (Altunbas and Marqués, 2008), and we expect this 
relationship to be stronger in the case of domestic deals, where the difficulties arising from the 
integration of the two companies are lower.  
The second group of strategic indicators we use is the ratio between loan loss provisions and 
net interest revenues (a credit risk measure) and the loan to total assets ratio. To measure the 
credit risk similarity between the two merging institutions we use the first ratio (LLPNIR), 
while we use the second one (NLTA) to calculate the percentage of institutions’ assets financed 
with loans. In this case, we expect banks’ performances to worsen when the merging banks 
have different portfolio compositions and asset quality, so when they are affected by different 
credit risk, in particular when the two institutions involved operate in the same country: this is 
due to the fact that economies of scale and economies of scope are more difficult to be achieved 
when there are important differences in terms of asset quality between the two institutions, 
which are also likely to increase the conflict among managers due to the different skills required 
to manage such different situations. For what concerns cross border M&As, instead, differences 
in asset composition may be positively correlated with changes in performance, given that these 
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types of operations are made mainly with the aim to increase revenues through a diversification 
of their sources (Altunbas and Marqués, 2008). 
A possible strategy that banks may pursue is the cost controlling one: in this case the aim of a 
bank is to minimise its costs to maximise its efficiency. To check whether a bank follows this 
strategy, we use the most traditional efficiency index, the so-called cost-to-income ratio (CTIR). 
Given the effort required to maximise efficiency, even through the use of economies of scale 
and economies of scope, we expect banks characterised by low costs and high operating 
efficiency to benefit from acquisitions with other efficient institutions, at least in the short run: 
there can be the case in which, for example, one efficient company acquires a low-efficient one 
to implement its low-cost strategy and to obtain benefits in the medium run. Typically, this 
happens in the case of domestic deals, but the same objective can be reached also in cross-
border transactions where, even though it is not one of the most traditional goals of this type of 
deals, it can be one of the resulting outcomes. 
The fourth type of strategic indicators is related to capital adequacy and it is calculated with the 
ratio between equity and total assets (EQTA), which measures the degree of capitalisation of 
the bank: in particular, this ratio determines the percentage of assets that are hold by investors 
and which are not, therefore, leveraged. The capital adequacy issue has become very important 
in the recent years when, due to the crisis, regulators and supervisors have increased their 
requirements to prevent a single bank to affect the whole European banking system through a 
contagion effect. According to the signalling hypothesis, banks may decide to merge with other 
institutions that have better capital ratios to suggest a correlation between different capital 
structures and performances, while some other researchers believe that lower capital ratios 
signal positive information, given that signalling quality through leverage is less costly for good 
banks (Altunbas and Marqués, 2008). 
Another strategic indicator is related to liquidity risk which, in our model, is measured by two 
different indexes: the ratio between liquid assets to deposit and short-term funding (LADSTF) 
and the ratio between net loans to total deposit and borrowings (NLTTDP). Since indicators 
related to liquidity are expensive to be maintained at good levels, managers focusing on 
improving liquidity should decide to merge with banks that have good indicators to achieve 
their goal performance after the deal. 
The last strategic indicator we will use is the ratio between capital funds and liabilities (CFL), 
which measures the percentage of capital funds with respect to total liabilities. This ratio is 
different from EQTA because it doesn’t consider the simple equity but the whole group of 
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capital funds, therefore measuring the structure of banks’ own capital. According to Altunbas 
and Marqués (2008), the capital structure of the merging banks plays an important role on the 
post-acquisition entity’s performances: in particular, according to them, the more the two 
capital structures are similar, the larger is going to be the performance change (ΔROE). This 
relationship is expected to hold both in the case of domestic deals and cross border ones. 
The dependent variable of our analysis is the change in performance, which is indicated in the 
model as ΔROE: it refers to the difference between the two years weighted average ROE of the 
post-acquisition new entity and the two years weighted average bidder and target’s ROE before 
the acquisition (in both cases, weights are represented by total assets of the institutions involved, 
measured at the end of the year). This approach, which considers the change in performance as 
dependent variable, was previously used also by other researchers, like Ramaswamy (1997), 
Chatterjee et al. (1992) and Datta et al. (1991): the main difference between their models and 
the one used by Altunabs and Marqués (2008) is the choice of explanatory variables. As we 
have already explained in the previous paragraph, Altunbas and Marqués were one of  the first 
to use only accounting-based strategic indicators to explain how strategic similarities affect 
post-acquisition performances while, in the other studies, researchers considered a lot of 
different information to classify the merging companies from a strategic point of view, like the 
market share or the operational efficiency (see for example Ramaswamy, 1997). In our model 
there are two groups of independent variables: the strategic indicators SIi,k, which are illustrated 
in Table 2, and two control variables Xi,j, which are, respectively, the pre-merger performance 
of the bidder bank (measured as bidder’s two years pre-merger weighted average ROE) and the 
relative size of the bidder firm with respect to the target (measured as the ratio between the 
target’s and the bidder’s total assets at the end of the pre-merger year). From the literature, we 
expect both these two control variables to determine in a significant way bank’s profitability: 
according to Altunabs and Marqués (2008), the relationship between the control variable of the 
relative size and ΔROE is ambiguous: in the case of domestic deals, the smaller the target with 
respect to the bidder (so the lower the RSIZE), the easier is for the latter to impose a cost 
restructuring process and therefore to improve the efficiency of the new entity, so we expect a 
negative sign in this relationship, while we expect a positive relationship in the case of cross 
border deals, given that in this case the aim is to increase and diversify revenues (the bigger is 
the target, the more the profitability improves). Even the bidder pre-merger performance 
(PREROE) is expected to influence the change in profitability (ΔROE): if the pre-merger bidder 
performance is high, it is very likely that during the post-merger period the performance of the 
new entity will be lower than the bidder’s pre-merger one. This is due to the fact that by 
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merging, the bidder consolidates the target’s financial statement, which is likely to be “worst” 
and so the performance of the new entity will be, in the short run, lower than bidder’s pre-
merger one, while it will improve in the medium run if the bidder is able to create value from 
the acquisition.  
For our analysis we used a hierarchical multiple regression model: this choice was made 
considering the high level of correlation between the explanatory variables, which is reported 
in Table 5. In fact, this regression model is particularly indicated in case of relevant correlation 
since it measures the consequences on the model of overlapping explanatory power of 
independent variables (Ramaswamy, 1997). This approach measures the importance of each 
explanatory variable by adding them one at a time into the analysis (moving from the easiest 
model that includes only control variables to the most complex one, which includes also all the 
explanatory variables related to strategic indicators), therefore revealing the importance of each 
independent variable in relation to the others that were previously included in the model. The 















What we expect to find was a statistically relevant relationship between the performance 
measure ΔROE and the explanatory variables. In particular, we would like to perform two 
different analysis to understand the differences between domestic and cross border deals: for 
example, in the case of domestic consolidation, economies of scale related to cost savings are 
easier to be reached and they represent one of the main reasons why banks decide to merge, 
since the new entity can improve its efficiency by eliminating redundant costs like the ones of 
overlapping branches or shared technologies. For what concerns cross border deals, instead, 
costs savings are more difficult to be operated, and this type of deal is generally pursued with 
the aim to increase and diversify the sources of revenues.  
Before performing the multiple regression analysis, we perform a simple descriptive analysis 
to briefly illustrate the main characteristics of the banks in our dataset. We present the 
performances of the institutions involved in the deal, and then we will illustrate the strategic 
indicators we will obtain from our analysis. After that, we will have a look at the correlation 
matrix showed in Table 5 and we will try to understand, through visual analysis and simple 
regression models, if there is a relationship (linear or non-linear) between the single explanatory 
variables (including the ones that were initially included as control variables) and the change in 




Our database was built considering the acquisitions that took place in the United States during 
the years of financial crisis (2007-2017). In particular, starting from a list of the most important 
acquisitions that were performed during this period, we were able to create a sample of 25 M&A 
operations that were performed during a period of five years (2008-2016). Given that all the 
acquisitions were performed in the United States, our analysis is performed on a sample that 
includes only domestic acquisitions. In building our sample, we put some restrictions on M&As 
to be included in our dataset: first of all, at the time of the merger, both the bidder and the target 
had to be independent financial institutions located in a US country; then, the bidder and the 
target must not have been involved in an M&A operation in the three years prior the acquisition: 
this is particularly important in order to isolate the effects produced by a single deal and to give 
time to the acquiring institution to fully integrate the target, allowing therefore the financial 
statement of the new entity to represent economies of scale, economies of scope and the 
efficiency achieved by the two institutions after the deal. The accounting information about the 
institutions that were involved in the M&A operations were obtained from the Database Orbis. 
 
3.6 Results 
We start our analysis with a description of the accounting ratios of the companies belonging to 
our sample: Table 3 shows the mean, the median and the standard deviation of the variables we 
are going to study.  
In the selected sample, bidder companies tend to be about four time larger than their targets 
(10,842,437.4 vs 37,328,403.08 thousand of $), but we should also consider that the standard 
deviation is pretty high, which means that sample is quite heterogenous. This data is in line with 
the literature, which has already pointed out that bidders tend to acquire smaller firms, but in 
our case the ratio between target’s and bidder’s assets is bigger than in other studies (in the 
research of Altunbas and Marqués (2008), bidders were seven times larger than their targets).  
For what concerns the diversification of the sources of revenues for the companies in our 
sample, measured using the ratio between other operational revenues to total assets (OORTA), 
target firms are, on average, more diversified than the bidder ones (1.26% vs 0.92%). This result 
is in line with the previous findings of researchers about domestic and cross border deals. In 
fact, as we have explained in Chapter 2, firms tend to perform horizontal acquisitions to 
diversify their sources of revenues, in particular in the case of cross border deals (which usually 
have the aim to reduce risks through diversification). 
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In terms of assets composition (NLTA), bidders and targets tend to be very similar with, on 
average, more than 60% of their assets employed as loans (65.63% for bidders, 64.08% for 
targets); in addition, targets seem to have higher quality assets (LLPNIR), as signalled by their 
lower loan loss provisions to net interest revenues (4.64% for bidders, 3.54% for targets). Even 
in this case, our results are in line with the literature.  
What is interesting to notice is that in our sample target companies are less efficient than 
bidders, so they have, on average, larger values of CTIR (72.29% vs 61.26%). Even in this case 
our results are in line with the findings of Altunbas and Marqués, but the difference in efficiency 
in their sample is much larger than in our dataset (1.8% vs 11.03%): this may signal that during 
the crisis bidders were even more interested in acquiring less efficient banks to improve their 
use of resources, in order to benefit, at the aggregate level and in the medium run, from an 
improvement in terms of profitability. So, looking at these data, we expect to find a significant 
relationship between ΔROE and CTIR to corroborate the strategy pursued by managers. 
In terms of capital adequacy, measured as equity to total assets (EQTA), we can see how, on 
average, targets in our sample are slightly better capitalised than bidders (12.04% vs 11.72%): 
even in this case our results are in line with the findings of Altunbas and Marqués (2008) and, 
in the two analysis, the post-acquisition entity registers a slight increase in their capitalisation.  
In terms of liquidity risk, measured by liquid assets to deposit and short-term funding 
(LADSTF) and the ratio between net loans to total deposit and borrowings (NLTTDP), we can 
see how targets have, on average, more liquid assets than bidders if measured with the first 
indicator (5.40% vs 3.34%), and the same can be said by looking at the second measure (75.11% 
vs 77.01%), even though, in this case, both the target and the bidder register, on average, good 
values (a combination of prudence and regulation require banks to have values around 80-90% 
for this ratio). According to the literature, in the case of domestic acquisitions, targets tend to 
be slightly less affected by liquidity risk, so our sample results in line with previous studies.  
Finally, for what concerns the ratio between capital funds and liabilities (CFL), targets tend to 
have, on average, a less complex capital structure than bidders (13.64% vs 15.41%): even in 








Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of merging institutions 
Variables1 
Target 
Mean Median Standard deviation 
CTIR 71.13 70.26 15.46 
EQTA 12.04 11.77 1.83 
NLTA 64.08 64.88 9.50 
LLPNIR 3.54 4.57 12.33 
OORTA 1.26 1.09 0.62 
LADSTF 5.40 4.08 3.47 
NLTDP 75.11 75.64 11.33 
CFL 13.64 12.99 2.70 
Total assets2 10,842,437.4 4,201,859 15,588,751.63 
Variables 
Bidder pre-merger 
Mean Median Standard deviation 
CTIR 61.82 63.9 6.03 
EQTA 11.72 11.94 1.82 
NLTA 65.63 66.54 10.28 
LLPNIR 4.64 3.39 3.36 
OORTA 0.92 0.96 0.58 
LADSTF 3.34 3.02 1.54 
NLTDP 77.01 79.82 12.8 
CFL 15.41 15.08 4.46 
Total assets2 37,328,403.08 14,601,394 62,774,456.02 
Variables 
Bidder post-merger 
Mean Median Standard deviation 
CTIR 65.34 6.71 10.48 
EQTA 13.09 13.02 2.61 
NLTA 64.94 67.01 8.73 
LLPNIR 5.31 4.83 3.57 
OORTA 1.09 0.99 0.56 
LADSTF 3.28 2.50 1.76 
NLTDP 76.3 78.5 10.93 
CFL 16.07 16.18 3.98 
Total assets2 47,440,705.28 18,793,855 65,710,013.29 
1In %. See Table 1 for the definition of variables. 2 In thousands of USD. 
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The general picture, therefore, is of generally large, less diversified and more efficient banks 
acquiring less risky (in terms of credit and liquidity risks) and better capitalised targets. 
To further describe the sample, we can look at Table 4: it contains some descriptive statistics 
about the variables we are going to use in our regression model. We can notice that the mean 
value of our dependent variable ΔROE (which measures the difference between the two years 
weighted average ROE of the post-acquisition new entity and the two years weighted average 
bidder and target’s ROE before the acquisition) is negative and equal to -0.72%, confirmed also 
by the median equal to -1.54%: this value is not in line with the one of Altunbas and Marqués 
(2008), which instead registered a value of +2.44%. This discrepancy can be explained in two 
different ways: first, there is an important influence of the time span to which the sample used 
to perform the analysis refers to. Our dataset includes transactions that were performed in the 
Unites States during the years of the financial crisis and immediately after (2008-2016), which 
produced, as we can see in Figure 21, remarkably negative effects on banks’ profitability, while 
the dataset of Altunbas and Marqués includes transactions that were operated from 1992 to 
2001, a period during which the economy expanded (with the exception of 1993, the nominal 
GDP growth rate was always positive) and so, during that period, banks could benefit from an 
healthy economic environment. This implies that acquisitions included in our sample, 
performed when the whole sector experienced a decline in their profitability, have produced a 
relevant impact on the average ΔROE. But even though the change in performance was, on 
average, negative, it doesn’t mean that banks that operated M&As had negative profitability: in 
fact, the value of -0.72% comes from the difference between the weighted average ROE of 
merging banks which was, on average, equal to 7.33%, and the ROE of the merged institutions 
which was equal to 6.61%. This signals that, probably, our sample is heavily influenced by non-
performing acquisitions: in fact, none of the bidder banks in our sample had a negative ROE in 
the two years before and after the acquisition, while only two targets experienced a negative 
profitability in one of the two years before the deal, meaning that the banks in our sample that 
performed acquisitions were not influenced that much from the crisis; in addition, 16 
acquisitions of 25 resulted in a decrease of profitability. This is a relevant information which 
may signal that, during and after the crisis, managers may have performed acquisitions without 
considering the strategic similarities between their company and the one they were going to 
buy: to confirm this hypothesis, we must analyse the relationship between the change in 





Figure 21 – US commercial banks’ ROE 
Source: Klaassen and Van Eaghen, 2016. 
 
Moving on with the description of the variables in Table 4, PREROE refers to the pre-merger 
two years weighted average ROE of the bidder company: as we can see, the performance of the 
bidder companies was positive (+7.07% on average). For what concerns, instead, RSIZE, it tells 
us the relative dimension of targets with respect to bidders: this ratio is equal to 0.44 on average, 
which means that targets were less than a half with respect to bidders in term of size (measured 
as total assets).  
Finally, for what concerns the other independent variables, Table 4 contains the weighted 
average of the absolute differences between the target’s and the bidder’s accounting ratios, 
calculated using the distance metric proposed by Drazin and Van de Ven (1985). As we can 
see, the size of these values is very heterogeneous: this depends on the way each ratio is 
calculated. For this reason, to correctly interpret these data, the reader must look at Table 4 
considering the values reported in Table 3: we registered, on average, relevant differences in 
all the variables we decided to use in our analysis, but the size of standard deviations suggests 
















Table 4 – Descriptive statistics of the main determinants of performance 
Variables Mean Median Standard deviation 
Dependent:    
    ΔROE1 -0.72 -1.54 3.56 
Independent:    
    PREROE 7.07 8.22 3.23 
    RSIZE 0.44 0.40 0.30 
    CTIR 13.00 9.4 12.96 
    EQTA 2.03 1.54 1.86 
    NLTA 10.31 7.58 8.56 
    LLPNIR 6.15 3.28 9.34 
    OORTA 0.68 0.58 0.57 
    LADSTF 2.78 1.69 3.07 
    NLTDP 11.19 7.30 12.47 
    CFL 3.68 2.38 4.36 
1 Measured in percentage points. 
 
We deepen the statistical analysis looking at the correlation among the explanatory variables 
included in the model, as showed in Table 5. As we expected, some explanatory variables are 
correlated each other, in particular the ones that share the same accounting information in the 
numerator or in the denominator, like, for example, net loans to total assets (NLTA) and net 
loans to deposit and short-term funding (NLTDP), which resulted to be strongly positively 
correlated. This is a serious problem if we use a multiple regression model, since a 
multicollinearity problem would probably arise: to overcome this shortcoming, he should use a 
hierarchical multiple regression model, looking, in addition, for warning signs of 
multicollinearity. For example, we must pay attention to multicollinearity in case the addition 
of an explanatory variable produces a remarkable change of regression coefficients, or in case 
an independent variable results to be strongly correlated with the dependent one but the 
regression model provides a non-significant regression coefficient or, again, when the sign of 
the regression coefficient is the opposite than expected.  
Given that the first step of our analysis is to study the relationship between each explanatory 
variable and the dependent one, now we will focus on the first column of Table 5, which 
represents the correlation between ΔROE and the independent variables. 
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The variable ΔROE has a relevant negative correlation with PREROE and EQTA, while it has 
a positive significant correlation with OORTA and CFL; less relevant correlations exists with 
CTIR (positive) and LLPNIR (negative). These results are in line with the findings in the 
literature and with our expectations. The correlation between ΔROE and the other explanatory 
variables are, instead, in line with the results of Altunbas and Marqués, except for OORTA: in 
this case, in fact, while their study signals a negative correlation between other operational 
revenues to total assets and the change in performance, our analysis suggests a significant 
positive correlation between these two variables. We will discuss this issue later, when we will 
comment the results of our regression models. 
Table 5 – Correlation matrix 
 ΔROE PREROE RSIZE CTIR EQTA NLTA LLPNIR OORTA LADSTF NLTDP CFL 
ΔROE 1           
PREROE -0.41 1          
RSIZE -0.13 -0.4 1         
CTIR -0.05 0.30 -0.22 1        
EQTA -0.46 0.52 -0.19 0.03 1       
NLTA -0.03 0.18 -0.28 -0.16 0.51 1      
LLPNIR -0.19 0.18 -0.32 0.47 0.06 0.09 1     
OORTA 0.44 -0.04 -0.25 0.32 -0.40 -0.10 0.05 1    
LADSTF -0.11 0.12 -0.18 0.66 0.13 0.01 0.16 0.20 1   
NLTDP -0.16 0.20 -0.32 -0.15 0.48 0.93 0.18 -0.21 -0.01 1  
CFL 0.40 -0.24 -0.24 -0.12 0.17 0.45 0.09 0.07 -0.16 0.51 1 
 
Before starting with the regression analysis, we deepen our descriptive analysis looking at 
correlation charts showed in Figure 21: in all graphs the dependent variable ΔROE is 
represented in the y-axis (in percentage), while independent variables are represented in the x-
axis (PREROE in percentage, the rest are absolute values). With those graphs we are try to 
understand what kind of relationship there exists between each explanatory variable and the 
dependent one: we know there can be linear and non-linear relationships, like exponential 
forms, quadratic forms, and so on, but what we expect from this analysis is to find linear 
relationships (if a relationship exists) since, in the literature, there are no evidences of non-
linear relationships between strategic indicators and performance. Therefore, we use correlation 
charts to test whether our small sample provides results which can be considered plausible and 
in line with the previous findings in the literature. Looking at the representations, we can see 
how all the graphs describe strong or weak linear relationships: of course, the most evident 
relationships are among ΔROE and PREROE, EQTA, OORTA and CFL (being this last the 
most evident one: apart for an observation, the other ones are distributed in a very small portion 
of the graph), which are the ones indicated also by the correlation matrix; on the other hand, the 
representation of the relationship between ΔROE and CTIR, NLTA and LADSTF seems not to 
follow any pattern in the distribution.  
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We then use simple regression models to investigate the relationship between single 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable ΔROE. The limits of this approach are 
inherent with the difference between simple and multiple regression models: to explain them, 
we will make an example using some variables we will use in our analysis. By doing simple 
regressions, for example between ΔROE and PRERORE and between ΔROE and RSIZE, we 
estimate the effect that PREROE and RSIZE have on ΔROE, but in case PREROE and RSIZE 
are statistically related, as it seems to be in our case, by making simple regressions we produce 
erroneous estimates of the effect that each of the two explanatory variables have on the 
dependent one since, by estimating PREROE, for example, we erroneously attribute part of the 
effect that RSIZE produces to ΔROE, to PRERORE. In other words, by using a simple 
regression model, we force one explanatory variable to explain as much of the variation of the 
dependent variable as possible, therefore producing worse estimates of the coefficients than 
would have been produced by a multiple regression model.  
Nonetheless, the reason why we decided to use this approach is the size of our sample. With 
only 25 observations, we can use simple regression models to produce statistically relevant 
results since, following the rule of thumb which requires at least 10 observations per estimated 
coefficient, we obtain consistent estimates of the coefficient and of the intercept, given that 
each of them is obtained by 12 observations.  
Starting from the results of the correlation matrix and considering the size of the sample, we 
don’t expect to find many statistically relevant coefficients from the simple regression analysis. 
Table 6 shows the results of the simple regression models describing the relationship between 
the dependent variable ΔROE and each explanatory variable: there are four coefficients that are 
statistically relevant with a p-value lower than 0.05, which are PREROE, EQTA, OORTA and 
CFL. Apart for PREROE, in the other cases intercepts resulted to be statistically significant too, 
but we are not particularly interested in them, since the aim of our analysis is to study the 
relationship between the change in performance and the difference in strategic indicators. For 
this reason, considering the limited size of our sample, now we focus on the sign of the 
coefficient of each explanatory variable, ignoring intercepts and not giving importance to the 
magnitude of coefficients. PREROE resulted negative (-0.4472), and this result is in line with 






Figure 22 – Correlation charts 
 
 
This means that also in our sample, the higher the pre-merger performance of the bidder 
company, the higher is the probability that the post-merger performance is going to be relatively 
low, producing a negative value in ΔROE. This is the so called “floor/ceiling” effect, which 
refers to the fact that in the short term, post-merger profitability is more likely to decrease the 
higher is the pre-merger profitability of the bidder.  
The second statistically relevant coefficient is EQTA: even in this case it is negative (-0.8800) 
and it resulted to be coherent with our expectations and with literature findings. This negative 
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relationship shows that the higher the differences in capitalisation (measured as the ratio 
between equity and total assets) between the target and the bidder, the higher tends to be the 
value of the strategic indicator EQTA, the more the post-merger performance is going to reduce: 
this result suggests that it is harder to integrate institutions with different capitalisations.  
An interesting result is the one related to OORTA: from our analysis, there is a positive 
relationship between the post-acquisition performance ΔROE and the difference in terms of 
revenue composition between the two merging institutions (the coefficient is equal to 2.736). 
In other words, the more two institutions have different sources of revenues (measured as other 
operating revenues to total assets), the more the post-acquisition entity is going to be profitable: 
this result is not in line with the findings of Altunbas and Marqués, who obtained a negative 
coefficient for the same relationship in the case of domestic deals. To explain this discrepancy, 
we consider that there is a substantial difference between the two analysis: the time span to 
which the two sample refer to. While the dataset of Altunbas and Marqués refers to a period 
during which the business cycle was expanding, our sample refers to the post-financial crisis 
period: as illustrated in Chapter 1, due to the reduction of interest rates, banks have experienced 
a reduction in their NII, registering a fall in their most traditional source of revenues which 
strongly affected their profitability. To contrast this phenomenon, banks decided to diversify 
their sources of revenues, widening their range of products: this explains why we registered a 
positive relationship between the difference in the sources of revenues and the change in 
performance. This result suggests that when interest rates are low, it becomes less costly, and 
so more profitable, to integrate banks with different product ranges.  
Finally, the last statistically relevant coefficient is CFL: our analysis suggests a positive 
relationship between differences in terms of capital fund compositions and changes in 
performance (the coefficient is equal to 0.3263). Even in this case, our results are in line with 
the findings of Altunbas and Marqués: even though they used a different strategic indicator to 
measure the degree of capitalisation (total capital to total assets), our results are identical. So, 
what we can say is that, from this analysis, differences in capital fund strategies between the 
target and the bidder resulted in better post-merger performances. 
As we have seen using simple regression models, there seems to exist a statistically relevant 
relationship between some explanatory variables and our dependent variable ΔROE. Given the 
small size of our sample, this kind of analysis is the best one since, for each analysis, we respect 




Table 6 – Regression results 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
PREROE -0.4472* 
(0.2101) 
         
RSIZE  -1.5577 
(2.4569) 
        
CTIR   -0.0146 
(0.0572) 
       
EQTA    -0.8800* 
(0.3552) 
      
NLTA     -0.01112 
(0.0868) 
     
LLPNIR      -0.0717 
(0.0781) 
    
OORTA       2.736* 
(1.169) 
   
LADSTF        -0.1302 
(0.2406) 
  
NLTDP         -0.0445 
(0.0588) 
 






















Standard errors in parenthesis. 
* p < 0.05 
 
On the other hand, however, the sign, and in particular the size, of each coefficient obtained 
using simple regression models may be wrong: this because the change in performance ΔROE 
is affected by all the explanatory variables simultaneously, while by performing a simple 
regression analysis, we force one explanatory variable to explain as much of the variation of 
the dependent variable as possible. To overcome this shortcoming, we try to perform a multiple 
regression model, bearing in mind that, given our small sample, results will be not statistically 
relevant. 
Table 7 shows the results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis obtained with the 
sample of 25 acquisitions: in the first regression model (the one that includes only control 
variables) the intercept and PREROE coefficients resulted to be significant (the p-value is lower 
than 0.05), while the coefficient related to RSIZE is not (even though its p-value is lower than 
0.1). By adding one more explanatory variable, PREROE and the intercept continue to be 
statistically significant, while the p-value of RSIZE increases above 0.1. In model 3, with two 
explanatory variables, the only significant coefficient is the one of the intercepts. All the 
coefficients resulting from the 3rd to the 8th model are not significant, while the addition of the 
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last explanatory variable CFL to the regression determines a huge improvement in results: 
EQTA, NLTA, LADSTF and NLTDP resulted to be statistically significant (ETQA with a p-
value of 0.05, the other ones with a p-value of 0.01). Even in this case, given the small size of 
the sample, we are more interested in the sign of each coefficient rather than on their size, and 
we ignore the value of the intercept coefficient: our results tend to be in line with the ones is 
the literature, with the only exception of OORTA and NLTA, which have the opposite sign than 
the one found by Altunbas and Marqués.  
Even though results are not statistically significant, we could try to draw some conclusions. In 
domestic acquisitions, a high pre-merger profitability of the bidder company determines a 
negative performance change, as measured by ΔROE: this result has already been explained by 
researchers (see Ramaswamy, 1997, and Altunbas and Marqués, 2008), who defined this as 
“floor/ceiling” effect, which means that a well-performing bidder have a high probability not 
to improve its profitability after the acquisition of a target company due to the lower 
possibilities to further improve its operating performance with respect to a non-performing 
bidder. A negative relationship exists also between ΔROE and RSIZE: this means that the 
bigger is the target with respect to the bidder, the lower is going to be the improvement in 
performance for the new entity. Altunbas and Marqués explained this negative relationship with 
the difficulty to integrate two different companies: the differences in organisations’ culture, in 
the range of product sold and the contrasts between the two management are going to be harder 
to be overcome, the bigger is the size of the target. 
For what concerns the coefficients related to strategic indicators, we can say that differences in 
efficiency (CTIR) and in capitalisation (EQTA) negatively affect the post-acquisition 
performance. The difference in efficiency is expected to produce its effect mainly in the short 
run, since the integration of the less-efficient company worsens the efficiency of the whole new 
entity, while it is expected to reduce (but not to disappear) in the medium run, when the cost-
control systems of the more efficient bank will be integrated in the less efficient one. In fact, 
according to the literature, usually there is little improvement after a merger (Rhoades, 1994). 
Differences in capitalisation, instead, seem to be related to negative performance because 
weaker capital structure tend to reflect a lower asset quality. Even in this case, results are in line 
with the literature. 
Differences in both liquidity risk indicators are related to a decrease in post-acquisition 
performance: this result is in line with the literature, and it can be explained with the difficulty 
to maintain good liquidity indicators. Since generally the aim of the pre-merger bidder is to 
maintain (or to improve) its liquidity ratios after the deal, if the target has worse indicators, the 
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bidder must use a lot of resources to improve them, therefore affecting its profitability, not to 
signal to the market that the deal has increased its liquidity risk. 
Differences in the sources of revenues (OORTA) are, instead, positively correlated with an 
increase in post-merger performances: this result is in contrast with the literature, as already 
mentioned in the simple regression analysis, and this discrepancy may be due to the different 
environment in which the banks in our sample operated with respect to the sample of Altunbas 
and Marqués (2008). In fact, as we have explained in Chapter 1, during the crisis interest rates 
were reduced by central banks, with the consequence that the contribution of net interest 
revenues to the profitability of banks reduced a lot. To try to recover their profitability and to 
react also to other changes in the environment in which they operate (see the raise of Fintechs), 
banks started widening their range of products and services: many times to offer new products 
and services requires specific capabilities and technologies, therefore it may be easier, faster 
and less risky to directly acquire a competitor which has already entered in new markets than 
to develop their own technologies. Another way to read this result is the following: banks which 
focused on traditional businesses (so which were not diversified in their sources of revenues) 
have suffered a reduction in their profitability when interest rates were reduced. If they merged 
with other traditional banks, their profitability would have not benefitted as much as in case 
they diversified their sources of revenues by merging with a diversified bank. The negative 
coefficient between differences in loan strategy (NLTA) and ΔROE seems to confirm this: if a 
traditional bank (with a high loan to total assets ratio) merges with a diversified one (with a 
lower ratio), it benefits more than in case the two banks have the same loan strategy. 
Differences in credit risk (LLPNIR) tend to be associated with negative changes in 
performance, while the opposite holds in case of differences in capital fund strategies (CFL). 
In the first case, according to the literature, the main difficulty is the complexity in integrating 
banks with different types of businesses: in fact, differences in credit risk may signal a 
difference in the business models followed by the two banks, in particular regarding the type 
and the riskiness of the customers to which they lend money. In the second case, differences in 
capital fund strategies seem to benefit the post-merger performance thanks to the increase in 
capital funds carried out by one of the two institutions. 
Finally, looking at Table 8, we can see the results of the ANOVA test: as we can see, the 
addition of explanatory variables produces relevant changes in the p-value of the model: in 
particular, the 9th model is the most statistically significant one, with a p-value lower than 0.01, 
which allows to refuse the hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal to zero. 
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Table 7 – Hierarchical regression results 































































































































          
R2-adj         0.5689 
F-value         4.167 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
§ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 8 – ANOVA results 
Model Res. DF RSS DF Sum of squares F Pr (>F) 
1 22 232.548 1    
2 21 232.121 1 0.427 0.0749 0.788324 
3 20 207.390 1 24.730 4.3384 0.056079§ 
4 19 201.158 1 6.232 1.0933 0.313463 
5 18 178.607 1 22.552 3.9562 0.066607§ 
6 17 167.890 1 10.716 1.8800 0.191918 
7 16 155.190 1 12.701 2.2280 0.157715 
8 15 131.107 1 24.083 4.2248 0.058988§ 
9 14 79.805 1 51.303 9.0000 0.009552** 









The aim of this work was to study the factors that determine whether horizontal acquisitions 
among banks are going to be successful or not. From the literature, we know that geographic 
and product relatedness play an important role in post-merger bidder’s performance, but just 
few studies focused their attention on the influence that strategic similarities may have on a 
deal. Since banks are firms, and firms have their own strategy and organisational structures, we 
believe that a strategic and organisational fit between the target and the bidder companies may 
have a relevant impact on M&As, determining the failure or the success of a transaction: our 
research question, therefore, was “Is there a relationship between strategic similarities and post-
acquisition performances?”. To answer this question, we developed different econometric 
models. 
We started from the study of Altunbas and Marqués (2008) and we built a model with eight 
different strategic indicators which, starting from accounting data, were able to quantify the 
differences in the two strategies followed by bidders and targets. Then we used a hierarchical 
multiple regression model, as suggested by the literature, to test whether differences in banks’ 
strategy have a positive or a negative impact on post-merger performances. From a theoretical 
point of view, our model differs from the previous ones due to the variables used to study the 
role played by strategic similarities in M&A operations: even though we used different strategic 
indicators with respect to the ones used in the previous studies, our results are in line with the 
ones in the literature, with the only exception of the relationship between post-merger 
performances and differences in the sources of revenues. Therefore, our work has contributed 
to the literature by offering an alternative set of independent variables which explain the 
relationship between strategic similarities and post-acquisition performances, allowing us to 
determine which target’s characteristics bidders should be interested in when they perform 
acquisitions. The discrepancy we registered with respect to the literature may be due to the 
banks’ need for diversification arising from a reduction in interest rates operated by central 
banks: this caused a reduction of banks’ net interest income, the most traditional source of 
revenues for banks, reducing the overall profitability of banking systems. 
According to the results produced with our sample, during the crisis large, less diversified and 
more efficient banks acquired less risky (in terms of credit and liquidity risks) and better 
capitalised targets. For what concerns strategic indicators, we found that differences in 
efficiency, in capitalisation, in credit and in liquidity risk, were negatively correlated with post-
merger performance, while differences in diversification of revenues, in loan strategy and in 
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capital fund strategy were positively correlated with post-acquisition profitability. In addition, 
a high pre-merger performance of the bidder and a relatively big size of the target with respect 
to the bidder, negatively affected the acquirer’s post-merger profitability. From these results we 
can get some policy and managerial implications: for what concerns managers, when they 
decide to perform M&As, they should consider which is the strategy of their bank and which is 
the one of the institutions they are going to acquire. In fact, according to the literature and to 
our studies, to create value for their shareholders, the two institutions must be compatible from 
a strategic and an organisational point of view. In terms of policy implications, instead, from 
our analysis we can say that in Europe there is room for further banking consolidation: the 
policy maker should encourage banks to perform M&As, creating ideal conditions (in particular 
in terms of political and regulatory uncertainty) to make the market work in the best possible 
way. An efficient banks’ consolidation process would improve banks’ efficiency and 
profitability and would prepare banks in facing the future challenges (like the digitisation 
process and the competition of Fintech companies) by strengthening their capital adequacy, 
therefore making the banking sector and the whole economy less exposed to banking system 
crisis and contagion risks. 
To conclude, we sum up the limits of our analysis and we give some suggestions for further 
research. The main limit of our model is the size of the sample used to perform the statistical 
analysis: as we have already explained, we know from the literature that the dataset must 
include at least 200 observations to produce consistent results, so the small sample of 25 
observations we have used to perform our multiple regression model didn’t allow us to produce 
statistically relevant results. As a second limit, our model studied only domestic acquisitions, 
but we know there can be relevant differences in results in the case of cross border deals, 
therefore it would be interesting to perform a cross border analysis to understand how they 
differ from domestic ones. Finally, our sample included commercial banks operating in the 
United States, but it is possible that results would be different using the same model with a 
dataset of European banks: in fact, even though our findings are in in line with the ones of 
Altunbas and Marqués, we must remember that their study refers to a different continent and to 
a different period of time, and things in Europe may have changed during the crisis. Future 
researches should use a larger sample to produce statistically relevant results, they should 
investigate the possibility of having different outcomes in the case of cross border deals and 
they should replicate this analysis with a sample of European commercial banks, to check 
whether our results are country-specific or they are valid for both the continents. Finally, it 
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would be interesting to replicate the analysis even with other types of banks, like investment 
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